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Abstract
Nation-building is often proposed as a device for integration and conﬂict reduction in
ethnically divided societies. This paper analyses the role of interethnic contact in the process
of nation formation within the unique historical setting of the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. Using
historical border changes as a proxy for exogenous population movements that inﬂuenced
ethnic diversity, I ﬁnd that interethnic contact stimulated the formation of the Yugoslav
national identity. In addition, aligned with the notion that nation formation can reduce the
incidence of ethnic conﬂict, I ﬁnd that areas with more self-declared Yugoslavs experienced a
lower intensity of conﬂict during the Bosnian War of 1992-1995.
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1 Introduction
Ethnically divided societies tend to be characterised by a higher incidence of conﬂict, weaker
institutions, and lower economic growth.1 In this context, nation-building is often proposed
as a device for integration in ethnically divided societies. Nevertheless, the determinants and
implications of national sentiment remain imperfectly understood.2 This paper analyses the role
of interethnic contact in the process of nation formation.
The relationship between ethnic diversity and national sentiment is ambiguous.3 On the one
hand, interethnic contact might breed hatred and conﬂict. The long history of anti-Semitism in
Europe is an evident example (Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Becker and Pascali, 2019; Koyama
et al., 2019). On the other hand, psychologists have long recognised that contact with members
of another ethnic group can lead to a reduction of prejudice and negative sentiment (Allport,
1954). The impact of interethnic contact might also depend on the relative size of diﬀerent
groups (Esteban and Ray, 2011; Esteban et al., 2012), or on the physical proximity between them
(Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2017). Whether intergroup contact is conducive to integration or
to conﬂict is therefore an empirical issue.
Yugoslavia provides a unique historical setting to study the relationship between ethnic
diversity and national identity. Although the formation of the Yugoslav identity failed because
the country dissolved, there were people who felt Yugoslav. Some people chose to identify with
the wider Yugoslav community, rather than with some of the narrower ethnic communities.4 This
is empirically useful, because it allows me to exploit the variation in national self-identiﬁcation
across the country.
Moreover, Yugoslavia was extremely diverse. There was a great deal of variation in economic,
cultural and historical conditions. As such, Yugoslavs were fond of describing their country as
one with two alphabets, three religions, four languages and ﬁve nations. This high diversity
is empirically useful as well, because it allows me to exploit the variation in socio-economic
conditions.
I analyse the relationship between ethnic diversity and Yugoslav identity at municipal-level. I
focus the analysis on the last population census of 1991, conducted just before the disintegration
of the country and the outbreak of violence. I analyse a sample of 433 Yugoslav municipalities,
and measure the strength of Yugoslav identiﬁcation by the fraction of people who answered
“Yugoslav” to the open-ended nationality question of the census. I measure ethnic diversity by
the ethnic fractionalisation index, under which many small groups will result in a high value.
1See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a literature survey, and Esteban and Ray (2011); Esteban et al. (2012)
for the theory and the empirics underlying the various measures of ethnic divisions.
2Seminal qualitative works that study the topic include Weber (1976); Anderson (1983); Gellner (1983);
Hobsbawm (1991).
3I use the terms “interethnic contact” and “ethnic diversity” synonymously. I also use the terms “national
identity”, “national sentiment” and “national feeling” synonymously.
4Yugoslav identity was diﬀerent to an ethnic-centred identity. Scholars studying the topic argue that Yugoslav
identity provided a “broader” national identity category for those who rejected the “narrower” ethnic identity
category (Ramet, 1992; Wachtel, 1998; Sekulić, 2004). Yugoslav identity was multicultural and pan-national. It
was based on the understanding of a nation as a cluster of “close” ethnic and cultural groups with equal rights,
contrasting the mutually antagonistic identities of the ethnicities that formed the country (Sekulić, 2004). To
illustrate this further; the distinction between Yugoslav and Slovene identity, for example, is comparatively similar
to the distinction between British and English identity. The interested reader can see Colley (1992) for a historical
analysis of English identity.
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Maps in ﬁgure 1 suggest that ethnically diverse municipalities were associated with a greater
share of people that identiﬁed themselves as Yugoslavs. Basic correlations conﬁrm this. One
way to interpret this is that interethnic contact stimulated Yugoslav sentiment. An alternative
explanation is that Yugoslavs conglomerated to ethnically diverse areas that tend to be more
tolerant. Alternatively, there may be other important factors, such as urbanisation and schooling,
that are correlated with both ethnic diversity and Yugoslav sentiment. Moreover, my key
variables might be mis-measured, biasing the estimates. I pursue several strategies to determine
whether the uncovered correlations are, in fact, causal.
My ﬁrst strategy is to control for various socio-economic factors that may be relevant, like
economic development, but also for many other cultural and historical factors. I ﬁnd that
controlling for various observable characteristics has little eﬀect on the estimated positive eﬀect
of ethnic diversity on national feeling.
My second strategy is to use the framework of Altonji et al. (2005) and Bellows and Miguel
(2009). I calculate how much greater the inﬂuence of unobservable factors would need to be,
relative to observable factors, to render my results insigniﬁcant. I ﬁnd that the inﬂuence of
unobservable factors would have to be about six times greater than observable factors. It is thus
unlikely that unobserved heterogeneity can explain away my results.
My third strategy is to conduct the analysis at a hyper-local, settlement, level. Settlements
presumably better correspond to the daily environment of an individual, and thus to the
interethnic contact that individual actually experiences. Indeed, this is exactly what I ﬁnd: the
positive eﬀect of ethnic diversity is much larger at a lower level of aggregation. Furthermore,
once I control for ethnic polarisation, under which a few large groups will result in a high value,
the eﬀect of ethnic fractionalisation is much larger as well. Both factors suggest that my baseline
results provide lower bound estimates of the positive relationship between ethnic diversity and
national identiﬁcation.
My ﬁnal strategy to establish causality is to use a plausible source of exogenous variation
in ethnic diversity. I would ideally want to ﬁnd random shocks to population movements that
inﬂuenced ethnic diversity, with these population movements having no direct impact on national
sentiment. I can approach such a scenario by using border changes between the various empires
that historically ruled and divided the lands of former Yugoslavia (e.g. Habsburgs, Ottomans
and Venetians).
The plausibility of the instrument is based on three premises. First, there is a great deal
of variation in historical border changes in Yugoslavia. Second, historians argue that border
changes caused shocks to the ethnic composition of the areas that later formed Yugoslavia. Third,
the impact of past shocks to ethnic composition persisted to the period of socialist Yugoslavia. I
extensively document the historical plausibility of the instrument in section 4.1. To improve its
plausibility, I measure border changes during the premodern and early-modern era (15th of 19th
centuries). It is unlikely that border changes were endogenous to ethnic diversity during the
premodern era, given that national identities are modern phenomena that emerged in the 19th
century (Weber, 1976; Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1991).
The instrumental variable (IV) estimates imply that moving from perfect ethnic homogeneity
(zero diversity) to the sample average of 0.28 increases the fraction of Yugoslavs by 3.6 percentage
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Figure 1: Population share of self-declared Yugoslavs and ethnic fractionalisation in Yugoslav
municipalities, 1991
(a) Population share of self-declared Yugoslavs
Quantile
	0.000	-	0.006	
	0.006	-	0.011	
	0.011	-	0.019	
	0.019	-	0.045	
	0.045	-	0.226	
Republic	borders
Fraction	of	Yugoslavs
(b) Ethnic fractionalisation index
Quantile
	0.000	-	0.062	
	0.062	-	0.142	
	0.142	-	0.343	
	0.343	-	0.499	
	0.499	-	0.736	
Republic	borders
Ethnic	fractionalisation	index
Notes: The correlation coeﬃcient between the share of Yugoslavs and ethnic fractionalisation is 0.56. I analyse a
sample of 433 Yugoslav municipalities, which form 87 per cent of the total amount of municipalities. I exclude
Macedonia and Kosovo from the analysis due to data issues. Kosovar Albanians boycotted the 1991 population
census due to Serbia’s dissolution of Kosovo’s autonomy, while the 1991 Macedonian census was uncompleted due
to ethnic tensions between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians. The data and the data sources are explained later
in the text.
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points, relative to the average of 0.027. To address the concern of whether the exclusion restriction
is satisﬁed, I perform several robustness checks.
I begin by conducting a placebo test. I examine the reduced-form relationship between
border changes and Yugoslav sentiment before and after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Border
changes after the dissolution of Yugoslavia could not have impacted ethnic diversity before the
dissolution of the country, and this is exactly what I ﬁnd.
I also relax the exclusion restriction following the framework of Conley et al. (2012). I ﬁnd
that the instrument would have to deviate very far from the exclusion restriction to render
my estimates insigniﬁcant. Moreover, the IV results are robust to the inclusion of additional
controls, an alternative measure of national sentiment, as well as to the diﬀerent levels of data
aggregation. While each of the empirical settings I use can be criticised on its own, the totality
of evidence suggests that the IV is plausibly exogenous.
After establishing that ethnic diversity positively aﬀected Yugoslav sentiment, I turn to the
task of establishing a channel of causality. The analysis reveals that the key channel linking
ethnic diversity and Yugoslav identiﬁcation is ethnic intermarriage. Ethnic diversity inﬂuenced
intermarriage, which stimulated Yugoslav sentiment. My interpretation is that the hybrid
Yugoslav identity provided an alternative to forcing a single category to intermarried individuals
and their children.
The second part of the paper documents some of the consequences of Yugoslav identity. I ﬁnd
that municipalities that contained a larger fraction of self-declared Yugoslavs were negatively
associated with the intensity of casualties during the Bosnian War of 1992-1995. While it
is diﬃcult to establish causality, it seems plausible that individuals with a multicultural and
pan-national sentiment were less likely to engage in an ethnic-based conﬂict, and die. Although
Yugoslavs died less, they lost their country.
This paper contributes to a nascent literature within economics that analyses the causes and
consequences of identity. In an inﬂuential set of articles, Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005)
incorporate identity, a person’s sense of self, into economic analysis. The empirical literature
that studies the determinants of national identity follows their lead. Blouin and Mukand (2019)
argue that media policy of the government inﬂuences national sentiment, while Clots-Figueras
and Masella (2013); Cinnirella and Schueler (2018); Bandiera et al. (2019) argue that educational
policy matters as well. Moreover, history can cast a long shadow, which is evident in the inﬂuence
of colonial legacy on national identities in Africa (Ali et al., 2018). War might also matter -
either through incentivising the state to provide public goods (Alesina et al., 2017), or through
mobilizing the people against an external enemy (Dell and Querubin, 2018). This paper makes a
contribution to the literature by analysing the role of interethnic contact in the process of nation
formation.
This paper is furthermore related to a large literature that studies the relationship between
ethnic diversity and development (see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a survey). The
contribution of the paper to this literature is twofold. First, it reveals one of the origins of ethnic
diversity, similar to Ahlerup and Olsson (2012); Michalopoulos (2012), and Ashraf and Galor
(2013). Second, if identity is part of the utility function as Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002,
2005) argue, this paper reveals additional economic importance of ethnic diversity. The results
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imply that ethnic diversity might have an indirect impact on utility through inﬂuencing identity.
Finally, this paper is also related to panoply of research about the dissolution of Yugoslavia.5
A large body of literature stresses the role of rising ethnic nationalism in the disintegration of
the country (see Jurajda and Kovač (2016) for a novel treatment). However, the determinants of
the ﬂip side of ethnic nationalism - Yugoslav identity - are largely unknown.
This remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 documents the historical
background underlying the idea of a Yugoslav nation. It also provides a conceptual framework
about the relationship between ethnic diversity and national identity. Section 3 provides a set
of OLS estimates, alongside a set of robustness checks. Section 4 documents the IV estimates,
where the plausibility and robustness of historical border changes as an instrument for ethnic
diversity is extensively discussed. Section 5 presents evidence that intermarriage is the key
channel connecting ethnic diversity and Yugoslav identiﬁcation, while section 6 documents the
association between national identiﬁcation and ethnic conﬂict. The ﬁnal section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Historical background and conceptual framework
I begin this section by documenting the historical background that underlined Yugoslav identity.
I proceed by outlining a conceptual framework about the relationship between ethnic diversity
and national integration. In appendix A.2, I provide a formal model to describe which individuals
might adopt a Yugoslav identity. The literature that I report in this section largely inspires that
model.
2.1 Historical background: Yugoslav identity
The idea of a Yugoslav nation emerged in the South Slav lands under the Habsburg rule during
the mid-19th century. It was a branch of Pan-Slavism inspired by the ideals of national awakening
of Romanticism and the French Revolution. “Yugo-Slavism” was based on the common cultural
and linguistic characteristics of, primarily, the Croats, Serbs and the Slovenes. Due to cultural
similarities, proponents of the Yugoslav idea believed that South Slavs belonged to a single
Yugoslav nation. They believed that Croats, Serbs and the Slovenes were three tribes of one
nation.
Wachtel (1998) argues that, in addition to cultural factors, political factors contributed to the
attraction of a national synthesis. It seemed unlikely that any of these ethnicities could achieve
autonomy within the Habsburg Empire on their own. Even if they managed to achieve political
independence, it seemed very unlikely they could maintain it in the presence of neighbouring
empires. For these reasons, cultural unity was the main aim of the movement, while political
uniﬁcation was left to an idealised distant future.
The distant future, however, arrived sooner than anticipated. The collapse of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire in the wake of WWI delivered it, allowing the creation of a South Slavic
state. The newly merged Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro joined together with most of the
South Slavs under the Habsburg rule to form a Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and the Slovenes (later
5See Jović (2009) for a literature survey.
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renamed to Yugoslavia). The South Slavs initially perceived the common state as an instrument
of gradual amalgamation of the various peoples, without the domination of any ethnicity. Reality
soon confronted these utopian pre-war ideals of national unity. There were signiﬁcant cultural,
social and economic diﬀerences among the ethnicities that formed Yugoslavia (Lampe, 2000).
Political fault lines were characterised by a struggle between the supporters of a unitary
state and the supporters of a federation. Political tensions soon transformed into ethnic tensions,
and the two became synonymous, as the supporters of the unitary state were mostly Serbs,
while the supporters of a federation were mostly the other ethnicities. As the supporters of the
unitary state soon prevailed, the non-Serbs perceived the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as an extension
of the pre-WWI Serbian Kingdom (Banac, 1984; Jović, 2009). This had strong implications
concerning the process of national building. Serbian domination contributed to the consolidation
of identities of the other ethnicities, hampering Yugoslav national unity (Sekulić, 2004).
A weak sense of common identity contributed to the fast collapse of the country under the
German invasion of 1941 (Wachtel, 1998). After leading the powerful antifascist struggle, the
communists, and their leader Tito, seized power in 1945. The communists were ﬁrmly committed
to the reconstruction of Yugoslavia, reorganising the country into a federation. Each federal
republic approximated the areas inhabited by the major Slavic ethnic groups to placate the
ethnicities that formed the country.6 By this, the communists attempted to reduce political and
ethnic divisions, and distance themselves from the unitary, interwar, Yugoslavia.
The communists did not pursue nation-building policies. To Edvard Kardelj, the main
ideologist of Yugoslavia’s Communist Party, the idea of a Yugoslav nation was a product of
capitalism and nationalism (Kardelj, 1979). The socialist state should not make nor deny nations,
like “bourgeoisie” states do. Instead, Tito and the federal leadership hoped that industrialisation
and modernisation would erode ethnic divisions, creating support for the common state (Sekulić,
2004). By this ambivalent attitude towards Yugoslav feeling, the communists sought to distance
themselves from the interwar Yugoslavia, where central authorities in Belgrade suppressed ethnic
boundaries (Banac, 1984).
There is another reason for the absence of nation-building policies. The ideological consensus
among the communist elite was that the state should be gradually weakened during the transition
process to the communist utopia. It was based on the Marxist notion that the state should
“wither away” (Jović, 2009). The “withering” of the Yugoslav state involved the establishment
of labour-managed ﬁrms and the devolution of power to the federal units. Kardelj believed that
these “socialist” features were the main unifying force of the country, rather than ethnic features
(Jović, 2009).
“Yugoslav” was not an easy answer to give in response to the open-ended census question
“What is your nationality?”. The communist elites were disinclined to place Yugoslav identiﬁcation
on an equal footing with ethnic identiﬁcation (Burg and Berbaum, 1989; Ramet, 1992; Hodson
et al., 1994b; Wachtel, 1998).7 The scepticism towards Yugoslav identiﬁcation was reﬂected
6Ordered by their size, these ethnic groups were Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosniaks (referred to as Muslims
during the existence of the country), Macedonians and Montenegrins. The two largest non-Slavic groups were
Albanians, which were concentrated in the Serb province of Kosovo, and Hungarians.
7Political and politically inﬂuential positions were distributed by ethnic criteria, especially at the federal level
(Banac, 1984). An individual lost access to these positions by publicly declaring herself as Yugoslav.
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in population censuses. Those that declared themselves as Yugoslavs were placed under the
category “Yugoslav - no national aﬃliation”. The implication was that Yugoslav identiﬁcation
was legitimate, although by this the citizen did not declare membership in an existing nation.
The tendency to view Yugoslav identiﬁcation as something lesser to ethnic identiﬁcation stands
in sharp contrast to the preceding Kingdom of Yugoslavia. During the interwar Yugoslavia,
population censuses did not contain a nationality question. The central government treated
everyone as a member of a single Yugoslav nation.
For these reasons, it was somewhat surprising that the share of population that declared
themselves as Yugoslavs increased over time in population censuses. The ﬁrst time the category
Yugoslav appeared in population census was in 1961. Then, 1.7 per cent of the population
declared themselves as Yugoslavs. By the 1981 census, the percentage of Yugoslavs increased
to 5.4. Of all the Yugoslav republics, Croatia contained the largest number of Yugoslavs in its
population, 8.2 per cent.
Republican leaderships were highly concerned about the increase of Yugoslav sentiment.
They perceived it as the deliberate attempt by the federal authorities, or other republics, to
shift the popular loyalties of their citizens, and erode their power base. Serbian nationalists
often interpreted Yugoslav identiﬁcation as the deliberate attempt by the Croatian leadership to
decrease the Serb minority in their republic. Croatian nationalists made the same arguments on
behalf of Croats in Serbia.
Sociological surveys indicate that Yugoslav identiﬁcation increased further during the 1980s
(Hodson et al., 1994b,a). With the rise of ethnic nationalism, the population share of Yugoslavs
in the 1991 census sharply decreased to about 2 per cent. These were the last Yugoslavs that
still believed in a common nation.
2.2 Conceptual framework
There are several reasons why ethnic diversity could have inﬂuenced Yugoslav sentiment. The
ﬁrst reason is that contact with members of another ethnic group can lead to a reduction of
prejudice and negative sentiment. Allport (1954) united the early research of psychologists
and social psychologists and provided the most inﬂuential exposition of the contact theory. He
claimed that prejudice and hatred is a result of generalizations made about members of another
group based on incomplete or mistaken information. It follows that prejudice can decline as
one learns more about the others. This implies that interethnic contact might decrease ethnic
antagonism and stimulate national integration.
There is some evidence in economics that validates the contact theory. Boisjoly et al. (2006)
investigate the consequences of intergroup interactions in the setting of a university. They ﬁnd
that white students who were randomly assigned an African American roommate developed
more positive attitudes towards the African Americans. Ferrara (2018) ﬁnds that workplace
diversity in the 1960s, induced by the high causality rate among the American whites during
WWII, stimulated racial integration in the U.S.. In another historical study, Jha (2013) ﬁnds
that medieval trading ports in India, characterised by intense interethnic contact, had a higher
degree of ethnic tolerance between the Muslims and Hindus.
The second reason why ethnic diversity can inﬂuence national sentiment is because it can
7
decrease the cost of identity switching. Caselli and Coleman (2013) and Manning and Roy (2010)
argue that ethnic identities are endogenous and that they can be switched, as long they are not
based on strong ethnic markers. Nevertheless, changing an identity entails a cost. Such costs
could include monetary costs, like lost access to jobs allocated by ethnic criteria, or physic costs,
like ostracism from an ethnic-based community. A higher ethnic diversity might decrease the
number of individuals that could punish another individual for “betraying” her ethnic roots,
decreasing the cost of identity switching, and stimulating national sentiment.
Finally, ethnic diversity can inﬂuence national integration through stimulating ethnic in-
termarriage. Sociologists have long recognised that intermarriage is of central importance in
interethnic relations. Intermarriage weakens the delineation of ethnic boundaries, and thereby
decreases the salience of ethnic identities (Davis, 1991; Qian and Lichter, 2007). Moreover,
intermarried individuals, and especially their children, are less likely to identify with a single
ethnicity (Waters, 1990; Xie and Goyette, 1997). Both reasons suggest that identiﬁcation with a
broader nationality might provide an alternative to forcing a single ethnic choice to intermarried
individuals and their children.
3 OLS estimates
This section provides evidence on the relationship between ethnic diversity and national sentiment.
I start by outlining the data, and providing a set of OLS regressions. I subsequently conduct
an array of robustness checks that lend some credibility to the OLS correlations. The results
are robust to a sub-sample analysis, diﬀerent levels of aggregation (settlement and individual
level data), ethnic polarisation, and selection on un-observables relative to the selection on
observables.
3.1 Data
Due to the decentralised nature of the country, Yugoslavia oﬀers a rich set of socio-economic
indicators at a local level. Although I rely on a variety of data sources, the 1991 population
census is the main data source that I use. The Yugoslav statistical oﬃce conducted the census,
but the results were subsequently published by the statistical oﬃces of the successor states of
Yugoslavia. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the main data I use in this paper. I describe
the data in detail with their sources in appendix A.1.
The main dependent variable is the fraction of population that answered “Yugoslav” to the
open-ended nationality question of the census. The main independent variable of interest is
ethnic diversity, measured by the ethnic fractionalisation index, e:
e = 1 −
M∑
i=1
s2i (1)
where s is the percentage share of an ethnicity in the population of municipality i. The index
measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a population belong to
two diﬀerent ethnic groups (Alesina et al., 2003). Its maximum is reached when each person
in a given population belongs to diﬀerent ethnic groups (value of one). I exclude people that
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics in socialist Yugoslavia and beyond
Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Main outcome variables
Fraction of Yugoslavs 434 0.027 0.034 0.000 0.226
Population share of war casualties, 1992-1995 109 0.024 0.024 0.002 0.198
Main explanatory variables
Ethnic fractionalisation (index) 434 0.276 0.210 0.004 0.736
Intermarriage (ratio) 109 0.071 0.054 0.000 0.276
Border changes, 1421-1816 434 1.592 0.920 0.000 5.000
Control variables
Output p.c. 434 8.611 5.527 0.908 58.905
Public goods exp. p.c. 434 1.458 4.891 0.055 98.389
Population density 434 125.997 340.657 6.359 5270.200
Avg. years of schooling 434 7.811 1.174 5.237 11.643
Social sector labour (population fraction) 434 0.596 0.220 0.064 1.000
Youth labour actions (population fraction) 434 0.050 0.084 0.000 0.725
WWII partisan veterans (population fraction) 434 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.056
Fascist terror (population fraction) 434 0.031 0.040 0.000 0.450
1980s’ generation (population fraction) 434 0.225 0.026 0.126 0.299
Working-age population (population fraction) 434 0.668 0.030 0.379 0.727
Religious fractionalisation (index) 434 0.259 0.212 0.003 0.718
Ethnic polarisation (index) 434 0.455 0.315 0.008 0.985
Minorities (population fraction) 434 0.295 0.300 0.005 1.000
Muslims (population fraction) 434 0.125 0.228 0.000 0.975
Duration of Habsburg rule (years) 434 160.546 173.357 0.000 497.000
Agricultural (wheat) suitability 434 2684.629 229.498 1792.667 3022.143
Terrain roughness (index) 434 20.632 12.223 1.706 88.696
Longitude 434 18.109 2.356 13.625 22.823
Latitude 434 44.597 1.106 42.000 46.716
Note: The monetary variables are expressed in Yugoslav Dinars (at current prices, in millions). The data and the data
sources are described in detail in appendix A.1.
declared themselves as Yugoslavs from the ethnic fractionalisation index because the econometric
exercises would otherwise suﬀer from reverse causality.
3.2 Baseline OLS estimates
I now use ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions to examine the relationship between Yugoslav
identiﬁcation and ethnic diversity.8 I extensively discuss the rationale underlying the choice of
each control variable that I use. The linear regressions are of the following form:
yi = α+ βei + γXi + ǫi (2)
where yi is the fraction of Yugoslavs in population of municipality i, ei is ethnic fractionalisation,
Xi is a set of controls, and ǫi is a random error term. The coeﬃcient of interest is β, the eﬀect
of ethnic diversity on Yugoslav identity.
Table 2 reports the OLS regressions of the fraction of Yugoslavs against ethnic fractionalisation
for a variety of speciﬁcations. Column 1 indicates that there is strong positive correlation between
ethnic fractionalisation and Yugoslav sentiment. The coeﬃcient is economically substantial. It
implies that moving from zero ethnic diversity to the sample mean of 0.28 is associated with an
increase in the fraction of Yugoslavs by 2.5 percentage points (0.09 x 0.28), relative to an overall
8Appendix A.3 experiments with diﬀerent estimators. They have no meaningful bearing on the results.
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sample mean of 0.027. The eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, whereby standard
errors throughout the main text are robust and clustered at municipal level.9
Columns 2-14 add covariates that might have impacted Yugoslav identiﬁcation. I add the
covariates sequentially in order to assess the stability of the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity. If the
coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity is unstable under diﬀerent speciﬁcations, this might indicate in an
informal way the presence of multicollinearity and/or the omitted variable bias.
Social scientists argue that the formation of nation-states is historically associated with mod-
ernisation and economic development (Weber, 1976; Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm,
1991). For that matter, as stated in section 2, the communist elite of Yugoslavia hoped that
economic development would diminish the salience of ethnic identities as a shared prosperous
community would emerge. To control for economic development, column 2 adds output per
capita, column 3 adds population density as a proxy for the urbanisation rate, and column 4
adds average years of schooling.
Symbolic representations of a new state, rituals of history, and images of shared destiny, are
important elements of national identity (Weber, 1976; Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm,
1991). One of the symbolic representations of the socialist Yugoslav society was the labour-
managed ﬁrm (Burg, 1983). Column 5 includes the fraction of labour that was employed in
labour-managed ﬁrms, or in the so-called “social sector”.
Youth labour brigades were an important tool in the development of socialist identity. Two
million Yugoslavs participated in these brigades between 1942 and 1990 (Popović, 2010). Youth
labour actions involved mass-scale voluntary labour implementing various projects. The most
famous one was the “Brotherhood and Unity” motorway that connected Zagreb and Belgrade.
Given that youth labour brigades were multi-ethnic, the communist party also used them as a
mechanism to create interethnic ties of mutual acceptance (Popović, 2010). Column 6 includes
the fraction of population engaged in youth labour actions.
Images or memory of a shared past could have further inspired Yugoslav sentiment. Connor
(1984) argues that the anti-fascist struggle during WWII, led by the communists, inspired a
sense of belonging to Yugoslavia. The antifascist struggle, for example, took a central place in
the study of history in primary and secondary schools. The communists deliberately emphasized
the interethnic nature of that struggle to heal ethnic divisions and to create support for the
common state (Koren, 2012). As such, column 7 includes the population share of WWII partisan
veterans to control for anti-fascism and the cultural transmission of its memory in the style
of Bisin and Verdier (2001). Additionally, column 8 controls for monuments to anti-fascism,
which contains sites that were oﬃcially considered to be of high importance in defeating the
fascists during WWII.10 Finally, column 9 includes the population share of individuals exposed
to fascist terror during WWII (e.g. survivors of concentration camps, forced labour, jails and
war captivity).
Provision of public goods is a major legitimating tool of states, stimulating national unity
(Weber, 1976; Alesina et al., 2017). Column 10 adds expenditure on public goods per capita,
9Appendix A.11 clusters standard errors at regional-level to allow for the correlation between the error terms
in observations within the regions. Clustering standard errors at a diﬀerent level keeps the key results unchanged.
10These sites, for example, include the municipality of Drvar, which was the location of the unsuccessful Nazi
airdrop designed to assassinate Tito in partisan headquarters in May of 1944.
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Table 2: OLS estimates, dependent variable: fraction of Yugoslavs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.0913*** 0.0914*** 0.0892*** 0.0887*** 0.0884*** 0.0911*** 0.0908*** 0.0906*** 0.0920*** 0.0912*** 0.0956*** 0.0939*** 0.0885*** 0.0964*** 0.0794***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
Output p.c. 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.000) (0.000)
Population density 0.0000 0.0000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Avg. years of schooling 0.0037*** 0.0153***
(0.001) (0.002)
Social sector labour 0.0143** -0.0057
(0.006) (0.010)
Youth labour actions 0.0097 -0.0195*
(0.013) (0.010)
WWII partisan veterans 0.5712* 0.3418
(0.332) (0.468)
Monuments to anti-fascism 0.0059* -0.0033
(0.003) (0.003)
Fascist terror 0.0359 0.0518**
(0.025) (0.025)
Public goods exp. p.c. 0.0001 -0.0011***
(0.000) (0.000)
Federal aid -0.0114*** -0.0043
(0.003) (0.003)
1980’s generation -0.0595 -0.1406
(0.071) (0.091)
Army presence 0.0144*** 0.0069**
(0.003) (0.003)
Region eﬀects No No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 434 434 434 434 434 434 434 434 434 434 434 434 434 434 434
R-squared 0.319 0.319 0.343 0.335 0.327 0.319 0.325 0.325 0.320 0.319 0.346 0.320 0.355 0.381 0.555
Notes: The data and the data sources are described in detail in appendix A.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
11
which was locally funded and provided. Column 11 adds a dummy variable whether a municipality
was recipient of federal aid.
Ramet (1992) argues that Yugoslav sentiment during the late 1970s and the 1980s was
promoted by the emergence of a strong pan-Yugoslav rock scene oriented towards the youth.
Column 12 includes the fraction of population that was young during the early 1980s, when the
rock scene was particularly vibrant (Ramet, 1992).
Burg and Berbaum (1989) argue that Yugoslav identiﬁcation signiﬁed political integration
and regime support. The Yugoslav army, as the largest beneﬁciary of federal expenditure, had a
vested interest in the survival of Yugoslavia. Dimitrijević (2001) argues that the army strongly
promoted loyalty to Yugoslavia during the obligatory service. Column 13 controls for army
presence - sites of battalions and divisions, army bases, or facilities.
To test further the interpretation of Yugoslav identiﬁcation as signifying regime support, in
appendix A.4, I control for the population fraction of the Communist Party members. I restrict
the analysis to Croatia due to data availability issues.11 The coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity
remains signiﬁcant, and is similar to those documented in table 2, which includes a larger
Yugoslav sample. Conditional on ethnic diversity and the baseline controls, there is no evidence
that the communists were more likely to feel Yugoslav.12
Finally, column 14 includes region eﬀects to control for region-speciﬁc un-observables (Bosnia,
Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia). Such un-observables could include educational
policies, which were region-speciﬁc (Sekulić, 2004).
Throughout the speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcient on ethnic fractionalisation remains highly stable.
Column 15 includes jointly all the considered controls. Given the inclusion of region eﬀects,
column 15 speciﬁcation exploits the within-regional variation in Yugoslav identiﬁcation, holding
constant regional institutions and policies. The analysis is thus not hampered by institutional
heterogeneity, which could otherwise make it diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀect of ethnic diversity
from institutions.
The coeﬃcient on ethnic fractionalisation in column 15, which includes all the controls, is
very similar to that in column 1.13 This is reassuring, as it indicates in an informal way that my
baseline OLS speciﬁcation is unlikely to suﬀer from a serious form of an omitted variable bias.
Nevertheless, I address further the issue of omitted variable bias later in the text.
3.3 Ethnic polarisation
In this paper, I measure ethnic diversity by the ethnic fractionalisation index. I can extract
corroborative evidence by analysing whether the eﬀect of interethnic contact persists when using
a diﬀerent measure of it. The alternative to the ethnic fractionalisation index that the literature
11I have not been able to ﬁnd Communist Party membership records for the other regions in the archives.
12Appendix A.8 also includes Communist Party membership using individual-level survey data.
13The coeﬃcients on population density, educational attainment, fascist terror, and army presence, are positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that economic development, as well as the exposure to WWII fascist
terror and the Yugoslav army, was positively associated with Yugoslav sentiment. The coeﬃcient on youth labour
actions and public goods expenditure p.c. is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. The negative coeﬃcient on
youth labour actions is unexpected. This might be a statistical artefact, as the eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant
only at the 10 per cent level. The negative sing on public goods expenditure p.c. is expected. Municipalities and
the regional units provided public goods. The consumers of public goods presumably associated the provision of
public goods with regional units, rather than with Yugoslavia per se.
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frequently uses is the ethnic polarisation index (Alesina et al., 2003).14 This index measures
how far a population is from a bimodal distribution.15 Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b,a);
Esteban and Ray (2011); Esteban et al. (2012) argue that ethnic fractionalisation and ethnic
polarisation indexes are closely related, but not perfectly. Many small groups of similar size will
result in a high value of the ethnic fractionalisation index, while a few large groups will result in
a high value of the ethnic polarisation index.
These diﬀerences are subtle, but important. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b,a) argue
that divisions along a few large groups (ethnic polarisation) aﬀect conﬂict, rather than divisions
along many small groups (ethnic fractionalisation). The corollary of this ﬁnding is that ethnically
polarised communities, characterised by a few large groups, should have a weaker belief in a
shared multi-ethnic community than ethnically fractionalised communities, characterised by
many small groups.
Table 3 demonstrates that this is indeed the case. In column 1, I ﬁrst reprint the eﬀect of
ethnic diversity from table 2 for ease of comparison. In column 2, I replace ethnic fractionalisation
by ethnic polarisation. The coeﬃcient on ethnic polarisation is much weaker than the coeﬃcient
on ethnic fractionalisation. This implies that the eﬀect of interethnic contact on national unity is
weaker in communities characterised by a few large groups, relative to communities characterised
by many small groups. In column 3, I include jointly the ethnic fractionalisation and polarisation
indexes. Now, the coeﬃcient on ethnic polarisation turns negative, while the coeﬃcient on
ethnic fractionalisation remains positive, but its size increases by about two times. Conditional
of ethnic polarisation, moving from zero ethnic fractionalisation to the sample mean of 0.28 is
associated with an increase in the fraction of Yugoslavs by 5.5 percentage points, relative to an
overall sample mean of 0.027.
These ﬁndings imply two things. First, conditional on ethnic fractionalisation, ethnically
polarised communities seem to reinforce the salience of ethnic identities, decreasing national
sentiment. Second, if ethnic polarisation is omitted, the size of the coeﬃcient on ethnic
fractionalisation provides a lower bound estimate.
3.4 Sub-samples and survey data
As further corroborative evidence, I now analyse whether the relationship between ethnic diversity
and national identity holds within several sub-samples. Given the inclusion of region eﬀects, my
baseline speciﬁcation exploits the variation of variables within the regions. The obvious extension
is to examine separately the data for each region that constituted Yugoslavia. In appendix
A.6, I present a table showing the eﬀect of ethnic diversity for the sub-samples. The coeﬃcient
on ethnic diversity in each region is broadly similar to the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity in
table 2, which includes the full sample. Slovenia, however, is characterised by a signiﬁcantly
14Another proxy for ethnic diversity that the literature sometimes uses is religious diversity (Alesina et al.,
2003). Of course, religious diversity might matter independent of ethnic diversity. Appendix A.5 documents
the relationship between religious diversity and national sentiment. Conditional on ethnic diversity, there is no
evidence that religious diversity inﬂuenced Yugoslav self-identiﬁcation.
15Following Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a), the ethnic polarisation index, p, is deﬁned as: p =
4
N∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
s2i sj , where s is the share of an ethnicity in a population.
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Table 3: OLS estimates with ethnic polarisation, dependent
variable: fraction of Yugoslavs
(1) (2) (3)
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.0794*** 0.1577***
(0.008) (0.031)
Ethnic polarisation 0.0461*** -0.0563***
(0.005) (0.021)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 434 434 434
R-squared 0.555 0.511 0.572
Notes: Baseline controls are output p.c, population density, av-
erage years of schooling, fraction of social sector employment,
population fraction of youth labour actions, population fraction
of WWII partisan veterans, sites containing monuments to anti-
fascism, population fraction of individuals exposed to WWII
fascist terror, expenditure on public goods p.c., federal aid, popu-
lation percentage of the early 1980’s generation, sites containing
army presence, and region eﬀects. These controls are identical
to those in column 15 of table 2. The data and the data sources
are described in detail in appendix A.1. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
lower coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity. Apart for Montenegro, the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity is
signiﬁcant in all the regions.
In an ideal world, I would want to estimate the eﬀect of ethnic diversity at individual-level.
I can do this only for Croatia and Serbia. I derive individual-level data for each of these two
regions from the 1990 pre-election surveys.16 These surveys include questions regarding the
demographic and economic conditions of the respondents, including their nationality. I match
this individual-level survey data with the ethnic diversity measure from the population census
for the municipalities in which the respondents lived. This allows me to test the relationship
between ethnic diversity and Yugoslav sentiment at individual-level. In appendix A.8, I show
that individuals that lived in ethnically diverse municipalities were more likely to self-identify as
Yugoslavs. Ethnic diversity and national sentiment are thus positively correlated even when
combining diﬀerent datasets.
3.5 Omitted variable bias and measurement issue
The results of the paper above demonstrate a strong positive correlation between ethnic diversity
and Yugoslav sentiment. There are three reasons why this relationship should not be interpreted
as casual. First, there is a problem of reverse causality, which should positively bias the OLS
estimates. Yugoslavs might have conglomerated to ethnically diverse areas, or feel more comfort-
able in expressing themselves as Yugoslavs there, because such areas tend to be multicultural
16I was not able to ﬁnd similar data for any other region.
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and tolerant.
Second, even though I control for a range of observable factors, there are omitted factors
that are correlated with both ethnic fractionalisation and Yugoslav identiﬁcation. Such factors
could include exposure to the idea of Yugoslav identity. As I cannot control for such factors,
omitting them should positively bias the OLS estimates. I use the approach of Altonji et al.
(2005) and Bellows and Miguel (2009) to assess the extent of the omitted variable bias. In
appendix A.9, following their approach, I ﬁnd that selection on un-observables would have to be
at least 6.7 times greater than selection on observables to overturn my results. This suggests
that my baseline OLS speciﬁcation is highly unlikely to suﬀer from a serious form of an omitted
variable bias.
Third, if ethnic fractionalisation index is noisy, and does not correspond well to the intensity of
interethnic contact, then the OLS estimates might be biased towards zero. Ethnic fractionalisation
index will underestimate the impact of ethnic diversity if municipalities were ethnically segregated.
For instance, within many municipalities, there was a village highly dominated by one ethnicity,
next to a village highly dominated by another ethnicity. When I aggregate such villages into a
municipality, this will show up as a high degree of ethnic diversity. This is potentially misleading,
if the villagers from one settlement were not actually exposed to the villagers from the other
settlement. Settlements (villages and town districts), rather than municipalities, presumably
better correspond to the daily environment of an individual, and thus to the interethnic contact
that individual experiences.
In appendix A.7, I assess the extent of this measurement issue by conducting the analysis at
a hyper-local, settlement, level. As expected, the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity is much higher
at a lower level of aggregation. The estimates I present in the main text, which are based on
municipalities, thus provide a lower bound eﬀect of the interethnic contact.
Nevertheless, the issue of reverse causality remains. Furthermore, while the approach of
Altonji et al. (2005) and Bellows and Miguel (2009) is useful in assessing the possible bound of the
omitted variable bias, it cannot alleviate it. To address these problems, a plausible instrument
for ethnic diversity is required. The instrument should be associated with the variation in ethnic
diversity. It should have no direct impact on Yugoslav sentiment.
4 IV estimates
In this section, I use historical border changes as a plausible source of exogenous variation in
ethnic diversity. The underlying premise of the instrument is that historical border changes are
a reasonably good proxy for exogenous population movements that inﬂuenced ethnic diversity.
I begin by outlining the historical plausibility of the instrument and conducting the baseline
IV estimation. I proceed by using additional controls, conducting a placebo test, relaxing
the exclusion restriction, and using an alternative dependent variable. I ﬁnish the section by
assessing the remaining measurement issues.
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4.1 Background: Border changes
There is a great deal of variation in Yugoslav lands concerning historical border changes. Areas
of former Yugoslavia were previously divided by the Bosnian, Hungarian, Habsburg, Italian,
Napoleonic, Ottoman, Serbian and Venetian rule. Scholars studying the region argue that border
changes caused shocks to the ethnic composition of communities, primarily because they aﬀected
ethnic migration patterns (Valentić, 1990; Žerjavić, 1993; Jurković, 2005; Dugački, 2009).
Of course, until the late 19th century, ethnicities in the modern sense did not exist in the
area of former Yugoslavia (Wachtel, 1998). However, border changes aﬀected cultural diversity.
Border changes implicitly aﬀected ethnic diversity because ethnic identities in Yugoslavia emerged
along religious and linguistic lines. Thus, for instance, the correlation coeﬃcient between ethnic
and religious fractionalisation index in Yugoslavia was 0.91.
Consider some historical examples as evidence. Because of the Ottoman invasion of modern-
day Croatia during the 16th century, a signiﬁcant fraction of the local population ﬂed to
modern-day Austria and Italy (Valentić, 1990). The emigrants were Slavic Catholics that today
consider themselves Croatian. The descendants of these emigrants are known as Burgenland
Croats in Austria and as Molise Croats in Italy.
Following Habsburg’s reconquest of eastern Croatia from the Ottoman Empire in the 17th
century, the Habsburgs established a military border as a bulwark against the Ottoman Empire.
They colonised the area with Orthodox Christians (now Serbs) from the area of modern-day
Bosnia. The Habsburgs oﬀered some economic freedoms to the immigrants in exchange for
service in the Imperial Army (Rothenberg, 1966). Furthermore, the landlords of some of the
reconquered areas invited ethnicities from the other parts of the Habsburg Empire to reinvigorate
the depopulated areas, like Czech and German speakers (Dugački, 2009).
To take another example, the recurrent wars between Venice and the Habsburg Empire led to
frequent border changes in Istria and Dalmatia. Žerjavić (1993) argues that both the Venetians
and the Habsburgs attempted to inhabit the depopulated settlements with immigrants. He
reports that both rulers attempted to attract migrants by oﬀering land, and ﬁscal and labour
allowances. Naturally, under the Venetian rule, the migrants came from modern-day Italy. Under
the Habsburg rule, the migrants came from the various parts of the multi-ethnic Habsburg
Empire.
As a ﬁnal example, consider Bosnia. Before the Ottoman invasions, Slavic Catholics (now
Croats) and Slavic Orthodox Christians (now Serbs) inhabited the country. The long Ottoman
rule of Bosnia (from mid-15th to late 19th century) stimulated a large fraction of the local Slavs
to convert to Islam (Lampe, 2000). The converts eventually formed a distinct Bosniak identity,
causing a change in the ethnic diversity of the region.
These historical episodes largely document examples where border changes caused positive
shocks to the ethnic composition of communities. Nevertheless, I do not imply by the above
selection of examples that this relationship should necessarily be positive across time and space.
It could be negative in some sub-periods or regions.17 The rationale of the instrument rests
on the observation that border changes caused shocks to ethnic diversity, whether positive or
17For instance, a sizeable Ottoman Muslim population ﬂed Serbia as the country gained independence from
the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century (Pavlović, 2015).
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negative.
I recognize that the underlying problem with the instrument is that it might be endogenous
to ethnic diversity. For instance, the Adriatic city of Rijeka in modern-day Croatia became a
Free State of Fiume in the aftermath of WWI. Due to its ethnic diversity, but also strategic
location, various neighbouring powers laid ownership claims on Rijeka. Given the political
standstill, the League of Nations elevated Rijeka to a status of an independent state as a sort of
a compromise solution. The independent status of Rijeka was short-lived - Italy annexed it in
1924.
To improve the plausibility of the instrumental variable approach, I measures border changes
during 1421-1816.18 It is unlikely that border changes were endogenous to ethnic diversity during
the premodern and early modern era (1421-1816), given that national identities are modern
phenomena that emerged in the 19th century (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1991).
Thus, as Italy was unifying at the end of 19th century, the uniﬁcation leader Massimo D’Azeglio
famously stated: “We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians” (Stewart-Steinberg, 2007).
Even in the case of France, with a long history of statehood, Weber (1976) argues that the
French national identity became widely entrenched in the population only at the turn of the 20th
century. In the case of Yugoslavia, which was a latecomer to the nationalist ideology, Sekulić
(2004) argues that Croatian identity became widely entrenched only during the interwar period.
Nevertheless, although ethnic identities are modern phenomena, it might be that premodern
and early modern border changes were endogenous to some religious or linguistic factors along
which ethnic identities subsequently formed. History suggests that this is not the case. The
three most important rulers driving the variation in border changes - the Habsburgs, Ottomans
and the Venetians - presided over expansionist and imperialist empires. Historians argue that
these empires were conquering areas according to strategic and economic criteria, rather than
cultural criteria.
Murphey (1996) argues that material factors largely drove Ottoman conquests because
soldiers and their commanders were entitled to booty. The material factor seems especially
important in the Balkans. The largely autonomous Bosnia Eyalet led westward Ottoman
conquests. It relied on irregular forces and mercenaries, which were particularly motivated by
the prospect of booty. Economic considerations drove the Venetian military strategy as well.
The Venetians targeted strategic coastal areas in order to protect their naval trade routes (Lane,
1973). The Habsburg military was driven primarily by economic criteria as well. They were
attempting to secure their Austrian heartland against the Ottomans by expanding the frontier
of its empire (Subtelny, 2007), with the aim of capturing the valuable coal and ore mines of
Bosnia (Ruthner, 2019).
Although history suggests that this is not the case, it is, however, impossible to decisively
reject the possibility that border changes do not satisfy the exclusion restriction. They might be
correlated to the error term, or to some co-founders that inﬂuence national sentiment which I
18The initial year of the instrument, 1421, is taken to precede the Ottoman invasion of the West Balkans. The
end year, 1816, includes the end of the Napoleonic presence in the region (Illyrian Provinces), while excluding
border changes that might be related to the emergence of nationalism among the South Slavs at the end of the
19th century. For example, the 1878 Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and the 1878 establishment of the Kingdom
of Serbia are likely both related to a rise of nationalism among the South Slavs. With the 1816 cut-oﬀ year, I
exclude both of these 19th century border changes.
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Figure 2: The amount of border changes in Yugoslav municipalities, 1421-1816
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Republic	borders
Notes: The instrument, border changes, is deﬁned as the number of times a municipality was transferred between
the various kingdoms, republics and empires that ruled and divided the lands of former Yugoslavia between 1421
and 1816. A border change equal to zero means that a municipality belong to single political entity during the
sample-period. See appendix A.1 for details about the construction of the data.
do not control for. In section 4.3, I substantiate the presumption of the exclusion restriction by
controlling for a range of additional factors that may be correlated with both border changes
and Yugoslav sentiment. Furthermore, I conduct a placebo test in section 4.4, and in section
4.5, I relax the exclusion restriction and allow the instrument to have an impact on Yugoslav
sentiment. All these tests suggest that the instrument is plausibly exogenous.
The instrument, border changes, is deﬁned as the number of times a municipality was
transferred between the various kingdoms, republics and empires that ruled and divided the lands
of former Yugoslavia between 1421 and 1816. Figure 2 depicts border changes among Yugoslav
municipalities. Figure 3.b plots the conditional relationship between ethnic fractionalisation
and border changes, while ﬁgure 3.a plots the same relationship, but in a more transparent,
unconditional, way. Both relationships are positive.
4.2 IV estimation results
Table 4 documents the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimates of equation 2. I treat ethnic
fractionalisation, ei, as endogenous, and estimate the following equation:
ei = λ+ ζsi + ηXi + νi (3)
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Figure 3: Relationship between ethnic diversity and border changes (1421-1816) in Yugoslavia
(a) Unconditional relationship
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(b) Conditional relationship
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Note: The relationship between ethnic diversity and border changes in subﬁgure 3b is conditional on covariates
included in column 15, table 2 speciﬁcation.
where si is border changes during 1421-1816. The exclusion restriction is that si does not
appear in equation 2. In the IV analysis presented in table 4, panel A documents the ﬁrst stage
estimate of ζ, the coeﬃcient on border changes in equation 3. It implies that moving from zero
border changes to its average of 1.6 increases ethnic diversity by 21 percentage points, relative
to the sample mean of 0.28. The F-statistic, equal to 51.83, indicates a very strong ﬁrst-stage
relationship.
Panel B presents the second stage estimate, where the variation in ethnic fractionalisation
caused by border changes predicts the fraction of Yugoslav. The coeﬃcient is economically
substantial. It implies that moving from perfect ethnic homogeneity (zero diversity) to the
sample average increases the fraction of Yugoslavs by 3.6 percentage points, relative to the
average of 0.027.19 The impact is signiﬁcant at 1%.
In the appendix, to provide corroborative evidence, I experiment with alternative instruments
(section A.10), and I apply the instrument to observations at settlement-level (section A.7) and
at individual-level (section A.8). The results are reassuring - the eﬀect of ethnic diversity persist
even under alternative instruments and data.
4.3 Additional controls
The results presented in table 4 are contingent on the assumption that border changes had
no direct impact on Yugoslav identiﬁcation, conditional on the controls. This assumption is
questionable if other factors correlated with border changes aﬀected Yugoslav feeling. Despite
already controlling for a rich set of observables, and despite using selection on observables to
assess the bias from un-observables, in this section I include additional controls that may be
correlated with both border changes and Yugoslav sentiment. I assess whether the inclusion of
additional covariates aﬀects the baseline results.
192SLS coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity is higher than the corresponding OLS estimate in column 15 of table
2. This suggests that the problem of measuring ethnic diversity dominates the issue of reverse causality and/or
omitted factors. The OLS could also be a biased estimate of an average treatment eﬀect that is diﬀerent from the
local average treatment eﬀect estimated by the IV.
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Table 4: 2SLS estimates
(1)
Panel A: ﬁrst stage outcome - ethnic fractionalisation
Border changes, 1421-1816 0.0729***
(0.010)
Baseline controls Yes
R-squared 0.403
Panel B: second stage outcome - fraction of Yugoslavs
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.1353***
(0.027)
Baseline controls Yes
Observations 434
Centered R-squared 0.476
Sanderson-Windmeijer ﬁrst stage F-test 51.83***
Notes: Baseline controls are output p.c, population den-
sity, average years of schooling, fraction of social sector
employment, population fraction of youth labour actions,
population fraction of WWII partisan veterans, sites con-
taining monuments to anti-fascism, population fraction of
individuals exposed to WWII fascist terror, expenditure
on public goods p.c., federal aid, population percentage
of the early 1980’s generation, sites containing army pres-
ence, and region eﬀects. These controls are identical to
those in column 15 of table 2. The data and the data
sources are described in detail in appendix A.1. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
Sekulić (2004) argues that minorities used Yugoslav identiﬁcation to uplift them from their
minority status. Column 1 of table 5 controls for the population share of minorities, which is
related to the amount of border changes (section 4.1). The coeﬃcient on minorities is insigniﬁcant
and the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity remains robust. Conditional on ethnic diversity, there is
no evidence that minorities were more inclined to feel Yugoslav.
The population share of Christians and Muslims might have inﬂuenced Yugoslav sentiment.
The initial supporters of South Slav unity were exclusively Christians (Wachtel, 1998), which
might had created path-dependency eﬀects. Muslims, on the other, did not seem attracted to
Yugoslavia before WWI (Bougarel, 2003). Moreover, the Habsburgs perceived themselves as
the defenders of the Christian faith and civilisation against the Ottoman invasion (Subtelny,
2007). They might had thus conquered areas according to some religious factor, like population
share of Christians or Muslims, although section 4.1 suggests this was not the case. Nevertheless,
column 2 controls for religion (fraction of Muslims).20 The coeﬃcient on religious denomination
20I do not control for Christians because a higher share of Muslims already implies a lower share of Christians.
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Table 5: 2SLS estimates with additional controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: ﬁrst stage outcome - ethnic fractionalisation
Border changes, 1421-1816 0.0443*** 0.0779*** 0.0685*** 0.0729*** 0.0773*** 0.0684*** 0.0763*** 0.0751*** 0.0460***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
Minorities 0.2957*** 0.3026***
(0.047) (0.054)
Muslims 0.2702*** 0.3261***
(0.066) (0.082)
Duration of Habsburg rule 0.0004*** 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000)
Agricultural (wheat) suitability 0.0001 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000)
Terrain roughness -0.0036*** -0.0003
(0.001) (0.001)
Distance to coast 0.0007*** 0.0011*
(0.000) (0.001)
Distance to river -0.0007*** 0.0003
(0.000) (0.000)
Additional geographical controls No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.499 0.440 0.426 0.407 0.437 0.448 0.419 0.446 0.600
Panel B: second stage outcome - fraction of Yugoslavs
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.1587*** 0.1266*** 0.1296*** 0.1353*** 0.1279*** 0.1335*** 0.1383*** 0.1555*** 0.1368***
(0.051) (0.024) (0.028) (0.027) (0.023) (0.029) (0.026) (0.033) (0.045)
Minorities -0.0177 -0.0116
(0.021) (0.017)
Muslims -0.0341*** -0.0374**
(0.010) (0.018)
Duration of Habsburg rule 0.0000** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Agricultural (wheat) suitability 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000)
Terrain roughness 0.0004*** 0.0007***
(0.000) (0.000)
Distance to coast 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000)
Distance to river -0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000)
Additional geographical controls No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 273 273 273 273 273 273 274 275 273
Centered R-squared 0.410 0.521 0.499 0.478 0.514 0.482 0.470 0.413 0.558
Sanderson-Windmeijer ﬁrst stage F-test 18.77*** 57.26*** 46.03*** 50.82*** 59.65*** 49.06*** 56.45** 37.94*** 16.03***
Notes: The variable Muslims is the ratio of Muslims to the population. Additional geographical controls are latitude, longitude, and an interaction between
latitude and longitude. Baseline controls are output p.c, population density, average years of schooling, fraction of social sector employment, population
fraction of youth labour actions, population fraction of WWII partisan veterans, sites containing monuments to anti-fascism, population fraction of individuals
exposed to WWII fascist terror, expenditure on public goods p.c., federal aid, population percentage of the early 1980’s generation, sites containing army
presence, and regional eﬀects. Baseline controls are identical to those in column 15 of table 2. The data and the data sources are described in detail in
appendix A.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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is negative and signiﬁcant, while that on ethnic diversity remains robust.
Historical aﬃliation to a political entity might have inﬂuenced Yugoslav sentiment in and
of itself. Becker et al. (2016) ﬁnd that historical Habsburg aﬃliation improves current trust in
local public services. Moreover, Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015) ﬁnd that legacies of empires
have an eﬀect on political outcomes in Poland, while Grosjean (2011) ﬁnds that common empire
aﬃliation improve cultural integration in eastern Europe. Historical memory of belonging to the
multi-ethnic and multicultural Habsburg Empires might have thus inﬂuenced people to identify
with the multi-ethnic and multicultural Yugoslav nation. Column 3 adds duration of Habsburg
rule, which is correlated with the instrument, as longer Habsburg rule implies a lower amount
of border change. The coeﬃcient on Habsburg rule is signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcient on ethnic
diversity remains robust.
Strategically and economically valuable areas - like areas with high agricultural suitability,
that are close to coasts and rivers, and with a rough (or smooth) terrain - are attractive
military targets (Keegan, 1993). Such areas might also have an advantage in trade and income
generation, perhaps exposing them to a greater degree of interethnic contact, and aﬀecting
Yugoslav identiﬁcation. Column 4 controls for agricultural (wheat) suitability, column 5 controls
for terrain roughness, column 6 controls for distance to the coast, and column 7 controls for
distance to the nearest river. Only the coeﬃcient on terrain roughness is signiﬁcant, while the
coeﬃcient on ethnic fractionalisation remains robust.
Given the spatial nature of the instrument, column 8 controls for latitude, longitude, and
the interaction between latitude and longitude. The model thus controls for the location of
municipalities. This is important, given that locations that are far from each other might be
more diﬀerent than locations that are close to each other, according to some factors I do not
control for. Nevertheless, the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity remains robust with the inclusion of
geographic coordinates.21
Column 9 includes jointly all the additional controls. Despite including variables that are
presumably correlated with both border changes and Yugoslav sentiment, the results are highly
reassuring. The coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity (0.137) is nearly identical to the baseline coeﬃcient
in table 4 (0.135).
Including additional controls lends some credibility to the claim that the instrument is
plausibility exogenous. Nevertheless, this exercise cannot decisively rule out endogeneity concerns,
and further robustness checks seem warranted.
4.4 Placebo test
My IV strategy rests on the assumption that ethnic diversity is the only channel through which
historical border changes inﬂuenced Yugoslav sentiment. If this assumption is correct, then a
positive relationship between Yugoslav sentiment in 1991 and border changes that occurred later
during the 1990s should not exist. To assess the validity of the IV estimates, I undertake this
falsiﬁcation test: I assess the relationship between border changes associated with the Yugoslav
wars (1991-1995) and the strength of Yugoslav sentiment. As before, I measure Yugoslav
21Appendix A.11 experiments further with spatial models. My results are robust to the inclusion of a spatial
lag of ethnic diversity.
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sentiment by the nationality question of the 1991 population census, which took place before
the outbreak of conﬂict and the dissolution of the country.
Table 6 reports the results. I begin by documenting in panel A the reduced-form relationship
between border changes and Yugoslav sentiment. Column 1 depicts a strong positive reduced-
form correlation between premodern border changes and Yugoslav sentiment. This correlation
is consistent with the IV estimates (panels B and C) - historical border changes inﬂuenced
ethnic diversity, and interethnic contact stimulated Yugoslav sentiment. In column 2, I conduct
the falsiﬁcation test. Border changes during the 1990s shows no systematic relationship to
the Yugoslav sentiment in 1991. The reduced-form estimates are close to zero, and highly
insigniﬁcant. This unsystematic relationship is consistent with the IV estimates, which are
insigniﬁcant as well.
4.5 Relaxing the exclusion restriction
Although my falsiﬁcation test provides evidence for the validity of the instrument, I recognize that
the requirement of perfect exogeneity is a lingering problem. In order to gain a further sense of
the robustness of the IV estimates, I relax the exclusion restriction that the instrument’s validity
relies upon. Despite including a rich set of covariates, the validity of the instrument depends on
perfect exogeneity which is, strictly speaking, unlikely to hold exactly. The instrument is rather
plausibly exogenous.
I follow the approach of Conley et al. (2012) to relax the exclusion restriction. They propose
a method which allows the instrument to have a direct impact on the outcome variable - in
this case, independent of ethnic diversity eﬀects. By varying the coeﬃcient on the instrument,
their method allows me to identify the threshold at which ethnic diversity becomes insigniﬁcant.
In appendix A.13, I ﬁnd that the impact of the instrument on Yugoslav sentiment would have
to be equivalent to 87 per cent of the overall reduced-form eﬀect to render the IV estimates
insigniﬁcant. The analysis thus reveals that the instrument would have to deviate very far from
the exclusion restriction to make my results insigniﬁcant.
4.6 Alternative dependent variable: Serbo-Croatian language
The totality of evidence so far suggests that the instrument is plausibly exogenous. In this
section, I use an alternative dependent variable to corroborate further the existing evidence
on the relationship between ethnic diversity and national identity. I use self-reported mother
tongue as an alternative measure of national sentiment - social scientists have long perceived
language as a critical component of national identity (Weber, 1976; Anderson, 1983; Gellner,
1983; Hobsbawm, 1991).
The main oﬃcial language of Yugoslavia was Serbo-Croatian. It is a pluricentric language
with four, mutually intelligible, varieties - Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian.22 The
22Serbo-Croatian was chosen to be the standard language of the South Slavs in the 1850 “Vienna Literary
Agreement” between the representatives of Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia (Kordić, 2010). The language was based
on the stokavian dialect, which was the most widespread dialect spoken in the western Balkans. Before its choice
as the standard language of the South Slavs, stokavian was spoken in parts of Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro and
Serbia. Stokavian thus seemed as a natural choice for a foundation on which a new standard language was to be
built.
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Table 6: Falsiﬁcation tests, reduced-form relationships and IV estimates
(1) (2)
Panel A: OLS, reduced-form results
Border changes, 1421-1816 0.0060***
(0.002)
Border changes, 1991-1995 -0.0012
(0.004)
Baseline controls Yes Yes
R-squared 0.544 0.528
Panel B: 2SLS, ﬁrst stage outcome - ethnic fractionalisation
Border changes, 1421-1816 0.0640***
(0.020)
Border changes, 1991-1995 0.0167
(0.033)
Baseline controls Yes Yes
R-squared 0.350 0.0632
Panel C: 2SLS, second stage outcome - fraction of Yugoslavs
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.0938*** -0.0700
(0.025) (0.319)
Baseline controls Yes Yes
Observations 211 211
Centered R-squared 0.6076 0.387
Sanderson-Windmeijer ﬁrst stage F-test 10.10*** 0.25
Notes: Panel A reports the reduced-form relationship between
border changes and Yugoslav self-identiﬁcation. I restrict the
analysis to Croatia and Bosnia. They were the only two regions that
experienced a variation in border changes within their territories
during the 1990s. The falsiﬁcation test is thus designed to go
against my results, because including the excluded regions would
further weaken the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients. Baseline controls
are output p.c, population density, average years of schooling,
fraction of social sector employment, population fraction of youth
labour actions, population fraction of WWII partisan veterans,
sites containing monuments to anti-fascism, population fraction of
individuals exposed to WWII fascist terror, expenditure on public
goods p.c., federal aid, population percentage of the early 1980’s
generation, sites containing army presence, and region eﬀects. The
data and the data sources are described in detail in appendix A.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
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diﬀerences between these varieties of Serbo-Croatian are smaller than the diﬀerences in the
varieties of German or English are (Kordić, 2010). All the speakers of Serbo-Croatian can
understand each other perfectly well, irrespective of the exact variety of that language that
they are using. Yet, the Yugoslav census allowed people to choose as their mother tongue the
category “Serbo-Croatian” or, for example, the categories “Serbian” or “Croatian”.23
The diﬀerences between these categories were subtle, yet important. Like elsewhere, language
and nationalism were closely intertwined. For example, Croatian nationalists were often stressing
the diﬀerence between the Croatian and the Serbian language in order to increase the salience
of Croatian identity (Kordić, 2010). They perceived Serbo-Croatian as a cover to forcefully
assimilate Croatians into the wider Yugoslav community. The implication of choosing “Serbo-
Croatian” as a mother tongue in the population census was therefore clear. It signiﬁed a sense
of belonging to a wider Yugoslav community, while choosing “Croatian” as a mother tongue,
signiﬁed a sense of belonging to a narrower Croatian community (Kordić, 2010).
In table 7, I use the fraction of population that reported Serbo-Croatian as their mother
tongue as a proxy for the strength of Yugoslav feeling. The coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity is
positive and substantial - moving from zero ethnic diversity to the mean increases the fraction
of Serbo-Croatian by 14.8 percentage points, relative to the average of 0.15 who reported
Serbo-Croatian as their mother tongue. The eﬀect is signiﬁcant at 1%.
4.7 The meaning of Yugoslav identity
Although language provides additional evidence that ethnic diversity stimulated national feeling,
there are three potential measurement issues that go against my results. The ﬁrst issue is whether
the Yugoslav category in the population census was a residual category. For example, it might
be that stigmatised minorities, like Jews, choose Yugoslav identiﬁcation to avoid stigmatisation.
If so, Yugoslav identiﬁcation did not reﬂect genuine Yugoslav feeling.
This seems very unlikely for two reasons. First, it is unclear why to Slovenian Jew for
example, saying “Yugoslav” to the nationality question of the census taker would have been more
convenient to avoid stigmatisation than saying “Slovenian”. Second, the Yugoslav population
census was egalitarian and inclusive (Markowitz, 2007). For that matter, some acceptable
answers were only remotely related to national identity. The census even reported regional
identity as a legitimate form of a nationality, for example Dalmatian.
The second issue is whether the Yugoslav identiﬁcation reﬂected ignorance and confusion. It
might be that people of mixed ethnic background opted for Yugoslav identiﬁcation to denote
their mixed background, irrespective of any Yugoslav feeling. This is unlikely for two reasons.
First, schooling is positively correlated with Yugoslav feeling (table 2). It is unlikely that people
that identiﬁed themselves as Yugoslav were ignorant of the connotations of Yugoslav identity.
Second, the population census allowed people to choose the “nationally undeclared” category.
This category might have been a more obvious choice to people who wished to denote their
mixed ethnic background, without choosing a speciﬁc identity category, alongside the associated
connotations.
23The census also allowed people to choose as their mother tongue Bosnian or Montenegrin, and many other
varieties of Serbo-Croatian.
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Table 7: 2SLS estimates with an alternative dependent variable - Serbo-
Croatian language
(1)
Panel A: ﬁrst stage outcome - ethnic fractionalisation
Border changes, 1421-1816 0.0729***
(0.010)
Baseline controls Yes
R-squared 0.403
Panel B: second stage outcome - fraction of Serbo-Croatian speakers
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.5368***
(0.132)
Baseline controls Yes
Observations 253
Centered R-squared 0.531
Sanderson-Windmeijer ﬁrst stage F-test 15.16***
Notes: The dependent variable is the fraction of population that reported
Serbo-Croatian as their mother tongue in the 1991 population census. I
exclude Serbia and Montenegro from the analysis. Their censuses did
not report Serbo-Croatian as a separate language category, but grouped
it instead in a single category with Serbian and Croatian. Baseline
controls are output p.c, population density, average years of schooling,
fraction of social sector employment, population fraction of youth labour
actions, population fraction of WWII partisan veterans, sites containing
monuments to anti-fascism, population fraction of individuals exposed
to WWII fascist terror, expenditure on public goods p.c., federal aid,
population percentage of the early 1980’s generation, sites containing
army presence, and region eﬀects. These controls are identical to those
in column 15 of table 2. The data and the data sources are described
in detail in appendix A.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is natural to wonder whether Yugoslav identity
was based on substantive ideals and norms. If not, people might have identiﬁed themselves as
Yugoslavs irrespective of their actual national feeling. In appendix A.15, I outline the meaning
of Yugoslav identity, which was infused with rich content. I focus on the work and thoughts of
the leading proponents of a supranational Yugoslav culture - the foundation of Yugoslav identity.
In case the reader ﬁnds the qualitative reasoning of this section unconvincing, in the remainder
of space I provide quantitative evidence that Yugoslav identity signiﬁed national sentiment. I
use individual-level data from a survey conducted in 1990 by a consortium of social science
institutes across the country (Baćević, 1991). The aim of the study was to gauge the attitudes
of Yugoslav citizens towards the socio-economic crisis that the country was experiencing at that
time. In columns 1 and 2 of table 8, I include as dependent variables some of the answers to
the survey question “What does the term “Yugo-Slavism” mean to you?”. The self-identiﬁed
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Table 8: The meaning of Yugoslav identity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
The meaning of Yugoslavism Sense of belonging
Nation-formation Supra-national identity Locality Region Yugoslavia
Self-identiﬁed Yugoslavs 0.5604*** 0.5559** -0.6785*** -0.8008*** 0.3450***
(0.211) (0.252) (0.111) (0.112) (0.123)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,211 4,156 4,219 4,220 4,220
Pseudo R-squared 0.0713 0.0663 0.0104 0.0197 0.0542
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual. Coeﬃcients from the ﬁrst two columns are derived from a
logit estimation, and the coeﬃcients from the last three columns are derived from an ordered logit estimation.
Education includes ﬁve categories, and occupation includes nine categories. Region eﬀects include all of the regions
of Yugoslavia - Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (including Kosovo) and Slovenia. Columns 1 and
2 include a subset of answers to the question “What is the meaning of the term Yugoslavism to you?”. Answer
categories are: “Only citizenship”; “Formation of a new nation” (column 1); “Supra-national identity (higher form
of nationality)” (column 2); “Protest against national antagonism”; “A way to show similarity to other nationalities
and ethnicities”; “Expression of patriotism, attachment to the system”; “Doesn’t hold meaning to me”; “I dont
know”. The respondents could choose only one answer to that question. Dependent variables in columns 3-5 are
answers to the question “How important is your sense of belonging to these entities?”. Answer categories are: 1 =
Unimportant; 2 = A little important; 3 = Average important; 4 = Quite important; 5 = Very important. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Source: Data come from a 1990 survey on the attitudes of Yugoslav citizens towards the economic, social and
political developments in Yugoslavia published by Baćević (1991).
Yugoslavs were more likely to answer that “Yugo-Slavism” signiﬁed nation-formation to them
(column 1), and a supra-national identity (column 2). Moreover, self-identiﬁed Yugoslavs were
feeling less attached to the their local (column 3) and regional (column 4) communities, and
were feeling more attached to the wider Yugoslav community (column 5). The existing evidence
thus ﬁrmly points to the conclusion that Yugoslav identiﬁcation signiﬁed national sentiment and
national unity.
5 Channel: Intermarriage
This section analyses a channel through which ethnic diversity had an impact on Yugoslav
sentiment. As stated in section 2.2, sociologists have long perceived intermarriage as a central
issue in ethnic relations. Intermarriage weakens the delineation of ethnic boundaries, and thereby
decreases the salience of ethnic identities (Davis, 1991; Qian and Lichter, 2007). Furthermore,
intermarried individuals, and especially their children, are less likely to identify with a single
ethnicity (Waters, 1990; Xie and Goyette, 1997). Both reasons suggest that identiﬁcation with the
hybrid Yugoslav identity provided an alternative to forcing a single ethnic choice to intermarried
individuals and their children.
If this holds, the logical step is to question why would ethnic diversity inﬂuence intermarriage.
It could do so for two reasons. First, ethnic diversity determines the potential number of
interethnic matches (supply). In addition, ethnic diversity might also inﬂuence preferences
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Table 9: Testing the intermarriage channel, 3SLS and OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3SLS OLS
1st stage 2nd stage 3rd stage
Ethnic fractionalization Intermarriage Fraction of Yugoslavs Fraction of Yugoslavs
Border changes, 1421-1816 0.0550**
( 0.026)
Ethnic fractionalisation 0 .5039*** 0.0013
(0.277) (0.007)
Intermarriage 0.3510*** 0.4956***
(0.073) (0.034)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.293 0.598 0.896 0.915
Notes: The analysis is restricted to Bosnia-Herzegovina since the intermarriage data is not available for other regions.
Intermarriage is the ratio of intermarried individuals. Baseline controls are output p.c, population density, average years of
schooling, fraction of social sector employment, population fraction of youth labour actions, population fraction of WWII
partisan veterans, sites containing monuments to anti-fascism, population fraction of individuals exposed to WWII fascist
terror, expenditure on public goods p.c., federal aid, population percentage of the early 1980’s generation, sites containing
army presence. These controls are identical to those in column 15 of table 2. The data and the data sources are described
in detail in appendix A.1. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
towards intermarriage (demand). Irrespective of the exact channel, which I cannot identify,
isolating the overall mechanism of intermarriage is a challenging task due to endogeneity concerns.
I begin by using the following system of three equations:
ei = λ+ ζsi + ηXi + νi
mi = δ + βei + κXi + ιi
yi = α+ φmi + γXi + ǫi
(4)
In this system, the ﬁrst stage predicts ethnic diversity by border changes. The part of the
variation in ethnic diversity caused by border changes then predicts in the second stage the
incidence of intermarriage, mi (ratio of intermarried individuals to total married individuals).
Finally, in the third stage, this variation in intermarriages predicts the share of Yugoslavs. I
estimate this system of three equations with three-stage least squares (3SLS), following Becker
and Woessmann (2009). This model accentuates the three-stage character of the argument that
ethnic diversity inﬂuenced Yugoslav sentiment through intermarriage.
I report the 3SLS results in table 9. In column 1, border changes are positively associated
with ethnic diversity. Variation in ethnic diversity caused by border changes has a positive
impact on intermarriages in column 2. Finally, in column 3, the variation in intermarriages
caused by ethnic diversity has a positive impact on Yugoslav identiﬁcation. The coeﬃcient is
substantial and signiﬁcant at 1%. It implies that moving from zero intermarriage to the sample
mean of 0.07 increases the fraction of Yugoslavs by 2,5 percentage points, relative to the overall
sample mean of 0.027.24
Even if the exclusion restrictions hold, my speciﬁcation assumes that ethnic diversity eﬀects
operated exclusively through intermarriage. This is, admittedly, problematic - it is possible that
24Given the nature of the data, I cannot isolate the overall eﬀect of intermarriage that can be attributed
between the intermarried individuals and their children.
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ethnic diversity operated through additional mechanisms (section 2.2). To test this possibility,
I estimate an OLS model with the share of Yugoslavs as an independent variable, and ethnic
diversity and intermarriage as dependent variables. The results are shown in column 4 of table 9,
where the coeﬃcient on intermarriage is large and signiﬁcant. Once I control for intermarriage,
ethnic diversity loses all of its association with Yugoslav sentiment - the coeﬃcient is close
to zero and insigniﬁcant. This suggests that the key mechanism linking ethnic diversity and
national identity is intermarriage.
The problem with the OLS model, however, is that intermarriage is likely endogenous, just
like ethnic diversity is. While I can instrument ethnic diversity with border changes, I do not
have an instrument for intermarriage. I thus use a diﬀerent strategy to assess the possible
presence of alternative ethnic diversity eﬀects.
I use the casual mediation analysis developed by Dippel et al. (2017). Within a 2SLS setting,
they modify the standard mediation model by adding an instrument that causes the treatment.
The advantage of this mediation approach over the standard IV method is that, with a single
instrument (border changes), the eﬀects of both the treatment (ethnic diversity) and the mediator
(intermarriage) on the ﬁnal outcome (Yugoslav sentiment) can be estimated. This allows me to
establish causality, while unpacking the mechanism that connects ethnic diversity and Yugoslav
sentiment.
In appendix A.14, I present the mediation analysis. The results imply that intermarriage
explains close to 60 per cent of the overall eﬀect of ethnic diversity. One could attribute the
remaining eﬀect to the other mechanisms documented in section 2.2. While each of the empirical
methods I use can be criticized on its own, the totality of evidence suggests that intermarriage
is a key channel through which ethnic diversity inﬂuenced Yugoslav identity.
6 Addendum: Yugoslav identity and the Bosnian War of 1992-
1995
In this section, I explore some of the consequences of Yugoslav identity. The causes and economic
consequences of civil conﬂict are extensively researched (see Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a
literature survey). Ethnic divisions undoubtedly increase the incidence of civil wars (Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol, 2005b,a; Esteban and Ray, 2011; Esteban et al., 2012; Desmet et al., 2012).
The corollary is that identiﬁcation with a nation should reduce the likelihood and intensity of
civil war. In order to examine this corollary, I analyse the correlation between Yugoslav identity
and the intensity of conﬂict during the Bosnian War of 1992-1995.
Table 10 present the results. The dependent variable is the ratio of war casualties to the
population. The controls follow the speciﬁcation of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b), and
they are reported in the table. The ﬁrst column shows that municipalities characterised by a
larger fraction of self- declared Yugoslavs were characterised by a lower intensity of conﬂict. The
eﬀect is signiﬁcant at 1%. Even though this relationship is non-casual, it seems plausible that
individuals that identiﬁed with the wider nation were less likely to be an object and subject of
an ethnic-based conﬂict, perhaps by ﬂeeing the country.
To control for ethnic divisions, in column 2, I include the ethnic fractionalisation index.
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Table 10: OLS estimates, Yugoslav identity and civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina
(1992-1995), dependent variable: population share of war casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of Yugoslavs -0.2087*** -0.3437*** -0.2873*** -0.1357**
(0.072) (0.079) (0.073) (0.061)
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.0497*** -0.0985***
(0.010) (0.037)
Ethnic polarisation 0.0390*** 0.0965***
(0.007) (0.026)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.064 0.155 0.211 0.248
Notes: Output per capita is included as a proxy for the opportunity cost of
engaging in conﬂict. Share of working-age population is included as a proxy for
recruitable soldiers. Expenditure on public goods p.c. is included as a proxy for
the beneﬁts of conﬂict, since it indicates possible revenue extraction. Terrain
roughness is included as a proxy for potential safe heaven for military factions
in hostile territory. The fraction of labour employed in labour-managed ﬁrms in
included as a proxy for local (work-place) democracy. Finally, I control for the
Yugoslav National Army presence, which was “hijacked” by the Serbian military
forces. The data and the data sources are described in detail in appendix A.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The coeﬃcient on the fraction of Yugoslavs remains negative, while the coeﬃcient on ethnic
fractionalisation is positive. In column 3, I substitute the ethnic polarization index for the
ethnic fractionalisation index. The results are similar to those in column 2. Finally, in column
4, I include jointly the ethnic fractionalisation and polarisation indexes. The coeﬃcient on the
fraction of Yugoslavs remains negative. However, the coeﬃcient on ethnic fractionalisation now
turns negative, while the coeﬃcient on ethnic polarisation remains positive. Thus, even when
conditioned by ethnic fractionalisation and ethnic polarisation, Yugoslav identiﬁcation remains
negatively correlated with the intensity of conﬂict. These estimates cannot be considered causal,
and the size of the coeﬃcients are likely biased. Nevertheless, the direction of the coeﬃcients
seems plausible - they mirror those of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b,a).
7 Conclusion
This paper isolates the impact of ethnic diversity on national identity in the historical setting of
the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. I ﬁnd that ethnically diverse municipalities were conducive towards
Yugoslav self-identiﬁcation because they stimulated ethnic intermarriage. I interpret this ﬁnding
to mean that the more hybrid Yugoslav identity provided an alternative to forcing a single choice
to people with conﬂicting pressures on their identity.
Did the formation of Yugoslav identity contain wider consequences? Aligned with the notion
that nation-building can reduce the incidence of ethnic conﬂict, I ﬁnd that municipalities that
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were characterised by a larger number of self-declared Yugoslavs experienced a lower intensity of
conﬂict during the Bosnian War of 1992-1995. Ultimately, there were not enough Yugoslavs to
preserve the country, and avoid the civil war.
Ethnic diversity matters. However, nation-building policies matter as well. Such policies,
however, were not attempted in Yugoslavia. The overwhelming fraction of population could not
identify with a Yugoslav nation, and the country disintegrated.
It is natural to wonder whether the ﬁndings of this paper contain wider signiﬁcance and
whether they can inform policy-making. The results suggest that nation building strategies in
ethnically divided societies could be particularly eﬀective in ethnically diverse areas, because
such areas tend to be more susceptible to the idea of a common nation. Moreover, to mitigate
the risk of ethnic tension and conﬂict, the empirical results of this paper imply a role for a
speciﬁc policy. Such policy could be the promotion of ethnic intermarriage, as the surest path to
a world without ethnic hatred and conﬂict is a world without ethnicities.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data
This section documents the construction of each variable that I use in this paper, alongside the
data sources.
Population and ethnicity - Population and ethnicity data for municipalities is taken
from the 1991 population census books of the successor states of Yugoslavia. For Bosnia-
Herzegovina: Popis Stanovništva 1991: Nacionalni Sastav Stanovništva po Naseljenim Mjestima
(Federalni Zavod za Statistiku, 1998a). For Croatia: Popis Stanovništva 1991: Stanovništvo
Prema Narodnosti po Naseljima (Državni Zavod za Statistiku, 1992a). For Montenegro and
Serbia: Popis Stanovništva 1991: Stanovništvo Prema Nacionalnoj Pripadnosti (Savezni Zavod
za Statistiku, 1993a). For Slovenia: Popis Prebivalstva 1991: Prebivalstvo po Narodnostni
Pripadnosti (Statistični Urad Republike Slovenije, 1994b).
Border changes - The baseline instrument, border changes, is deﬁned as the amount of
political entities a municipality had belonged to between 1421 and 1816. For Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, Slovenia, and most of Montenegro, I derive the instrument from a historical atlas which
focuses on Croatia, but also covers surrounding regions - Povijesni Atlas Hrvatske (Historical
Atlas of Croatia, (Regan and Kaniški, 2003)). For Serbia, and partly for Montenegro, I derive
the instrument from a set of additional historical atlases (Novaković, 1965; Šehić and Tepić,
2002; Hötte, 2015). I have included all border changes that are reported in these atlases. The
baseline instrument, however, excludes reconquests of territories to minimise measurement issues.
Reconquests are under-reported in historical atlases, particularly if ruler managed to hold to a
territory for a brief period of time in the presence of military oﬀensives and counter-oﬀensives
(Regan and Kaniški, 2003).
Religiosity and Muslims - Data on religious structure of municipalities is taken from the
1991 population census books of the successor states of Yugoslavia. For Bosnia-Herzegovina:
Popis Stanovništva 1991: Etnička Obilježlja Stanovništva, Rezultati za Republiku i po Opštinama
(Federalni Zavod za Statistiku, 1993). For Croatia: Popis Stanovništva 1991: Stanovništvo Prema
Vjeroispovijesti i Materinskom Jeziku, po Naseljima (Državni Zavod za Statistiku, 1992a). For
Montenegro and Serbia: Popis Stanovništva 1991: Stanovništvo Prema Veroispovesti (Savezni
Zavod za Statistiku, 1991a). For Slovenia: Popis Prebivalstva 1991: Prebivalstvo po Veroizpovedi
(Statistični Urad Republike Slovenije, 1994d).
Language - Data on the self-reported mother tongue is taken from the 1991 population
census books of the successor states of Yugoslavia. For Bosnia-Herzegovina: Popis Stanovništva
1991: Etnička Obilježlja Stanovništva, Rezultati za Republiku i po Opštinama (Federalni Zavod
za Statistiku, 1993). For Croatia: Popis Stanovništva 1991: Stanovništvo Prema Vjeroispovijesti
i Materinskom Jeziku, po Naseljima (Državni Zavod za Statistiku, 1992a). For Slovenia: Popis
Prebivalstva 1991: Prebivalstvo po Veroizpovedi (Statistični Urad Republike Slovenije, 1994d).
Output p.c. - Municipality output data is taken from the 1991 Yugoslav Statistical
Yearbook: Statistički Godišnjak SFR Jugoslavije 1991 (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991b).
Output data is reported for 1989. The successor states of Yugoslavia had stopped estimating
output at municipal level afterwards. Thus, the ﬁnal year for which output has been estimated
is the year 1989. As in other socialist countries, Yugoslav statisticians excluded some services
from the value of output - education, healthcare, and housing. Output is normalised by the 1991
population.
Population density - Population density of municipalities is constructed by dividing
population by the administrative area (km2). Data on administrative areas is taken from the
Statistički Godišnjak SFR Jugoslavije 1991 (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991b).
Average years of schooling - Educational attainment for each municipality is estimated
for the population aged 15 and above. With the exception of Montenegro and Serbia, average
years of schooling for the population of each municipality is constructed from the 1991 population
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census books of the successor states of Yugoslavia. For Bosnia-Herzegovina: Popis Stanovništva
1991: Uporedni Podaci 1971, 1981, 1991 (Federalni Zavod za Statistiku, 1998c). For Croatia:
Popis Stanovništva 1991: Stanovništvo Prema Školskoj Spremi, Pismenosti i Spolu po Naseljima
(Državni Zavod za Statistiku, 1992b). For Slovenia: Popis Prebivalstva 1991: Prebivalstvo,
Staro 15 Let ali vec, po Spolu, Izobrazbi in Pismenosti (Statistični Urad Republike Slovenije,
1994e). For Serbia and Montenegro, the 1991 population census does not record educational
attainment at municipal level. As such, I have interpolated educational attainment for each
municipality from the population census from the two nearest population censuses that reported
this information. For Montenegro, I have interpolated the 1991 values from Popis Stanovništva
1971: Etnička, Prosvetna i Ekonomska Obilježlja Stanovništva i Domaćinstva Prema Broju
Članova, Rezultati po Opštinama (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1974) and Popis Stanovništva
2003: Školska Sprema i Pismenost, Rezultati po Opštinama (Zavod za Statistiku, 2005). For
Serbia, I have interpolated the 1991 values from Popis Stanovništva 1971: Etnička, Prosvetna i
Ekonomska Obilježlja Stanovništva i Domaćinstva Prema Broju Članova, Rezultati po Opštinama
(Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1974) and Popis Stanovništva 2002: Školska Sprema i Pismenost,
Prema Opštinama (Republički Zavod za Statistiku, 2003).
Social sector labour - Municipality data for social sector employment as a fraction of total
labour is taken from the 1991 population census books of the successor states of Yugoslavia. For
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Popis Stanovništva 1991: Uporedni Podaci 1971, 1981, 1991 (Federalni
Zavod za Statistiku, 1998c). For Croatia: Popis Stanovništva 1991: Aktivno Stanovnistvo u
Zemlji koje Obavlja Zanimanje, Prema Području Djelatnosti, po Naseljima (Državni Zavod za
Statistiku, 1994a). For Montenegro and Serbia Popis Stanovništva 1991: vol. 24 (Savezni Zavod
za Statistiku, 1993b). For Slovenia: Popis Prebivalstva 1991: Aktivno Prebivalstvo, ki Pravlja
Poklic, po Dejavnosti (brez Oseb, ki Delajo v Tujini in Družinskih Članov, ki z Njimi Živijo v
Tujini (Statistični Urad Republike Slovenije, 1994a).
Youth labour actions - Data on number of individuals involved in youth labour actions is
taken from Statistički Bilten Broj 418.: Omladinske Radne Akcije 1964. i 1965 (Savezni Zavod
za Statistiku, 1966a). The ﬁnal year the Yugoslav statistical oﬃce has published this data for is
1965. I thus use data on individuals involved in youth labour actions in 1965, and normalise it
by 1965 population taken from Statistički Godišnjak SFR Jugoslavije 1966 (Savezni Zavod za
Statistiku, 1966c)
WWII partisan veterans - Data on partisan veterans of WWII resident in a municipality
is taken from Statistički Bilten Broj 1411: Borci, Vojni Invalidi i Porodice Palih Boraca -
Korisnici Osnovnih Prava po Saveznim Propisima, 31.12.1981. (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku,
1982). This data is reported for 1981, and has not been reported again since. I thus use the 1981
data on partisan veterans resident in a municipality, and normalise it by the 1981 population
taken from Statistički Godišnjak SFR Jugoslavije 1991 (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991b).
Monuments to anti-fascism - This is a dummy variable reporting whether a municipality
contained a site or event that was considered oﬃcially to be of high importance to the anti-fascist,
communist-led, struggle during WWII. These were often commemorated by a memorial complex,
museum, or a monument, whereby the largest memorial centres were visited by as much as 5
million people on an annual basis (Jokić, 1986). I take this data from a detailed tourist guide
(446 pages) dedicated to such sites (Jokić, 1986).
Fascist terror - This is oﬃcial data on number of individuals exposed to fascist terror
during WWII at current municipality of residence, and that survived. It is taken from the census
that collected this data - Žrtve Rata, 1941-1945 (Rezultati Popisa) (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku,
1966d). The survivors include those that were in internment and deportation camps, jails, war
captivity, and experienced forced labour. The census was conducted in 1964, but remained a
top-secret publication used for internal use by top-ranking Communist Party members only until
the dissolution of Yugoslavia, as census data on individuals killed by fascists did not conform to
oﬃcial public ﬁgures, which were magniﬁed. As the data on individuals exposed to fascist terror
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is reported for 1964, I normalise it by the 1964 population taken from Statistički Godišnjak SFR
Jugoslavije 1965 (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1966b)
Public goods exp. p.c. - Expenditure on public goods includes education, healthcare and
social care. Municipality data is taken from the Statistički Godišnjak SFR Jugoslavije 1991
(Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991b) for 1989 (the last reported year). Expenditure on public
goods is normalised by the 1991 population.
Federal Aid - This is a dummy variable capturing whether a municipality was a recipient
of federal aid. I can determine whether a municipality was a recipient aid only until 1963.
Afterwards, the statistical yearbooks, or other oﬃcial publications, stopped reporting this
information. The data on the 1963 recipients of federal aid is taken from the Statistički
Godišnjak SFR Jugoslavije 1964 (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1964).
1980’s generation - I deﬁne the early 1980s youth as the fraction of population in 1991 that
was between 25 and 39 years. The data for municipalities is taken from the 1991 population census
books of the successor states of Yugoslavia. For Bosnia-Herzegovina: Popis Stanovništva 1991:
Stanovništvo Prema Starosti i Spolu po Naseljenim Mjestima (Federalni Zavod za Statistiku,
1998b). For Croatia: Popis Stanovništva 1991: Stanovništvo Prema Spolu i Starosti, po Naseljima
(Državni Zavod za Statistiku, 1994b). For Slovenia: Popis Prebivalstva 1991: Prebivalstvo po
Starosti in Spolu (Statistični Urad Republike Slovenije, 1994c).
Army presence - Yugoslav National Army presence in municipalities is measured for
1990. It includes the amount of battalions, divisions, army headquarters, naval bases, airports,
academies, training centres, and research facilities. I take the data from Dragoner (online).
Communist Party members - I have gathered data on Communist Party members per
municipality from the internal documentation of the Centralni Komitet Saveza Komunista
Hrvatske (Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia). The documentation can
be accessed in the Croatian State Archives. The data comes from the membership reports that
municipal branches of the Party were sending to their headquarters in Zagreb. The population
fraction of Party’s members is reported for 1962. I have not been able to access or ﬁnd data for
any later year. Municipality membership reports have been removed from the documentation of
the later years. The amount of Party members is normalised by the 1961 population. Data on
1961 population at the level of municipalities is taken from the same internal documentation.
Duration of Habsburg rule - Data on the duration of the historic aﬃliation of a munici-
pality with the Habsburgs is derived from Regan and Kaniški (2003); Novaković (1965); Šehić
and Tepić (2002); Hötte (2015).
Agricultural (wheat) suitability - Data on the land suitability for wheat production is
taken from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. FAO provides
a set of raster data covering the agroecological environment at the global level. The data provide
a suﬃciently high resolution to examine the average quality of land in the municipalities of
Yugoslavia.
Terrain roughness - This variable is calculated as the mean diﬀerence between a central
pixel and its surrounding cells. I used the European elevation (raster) data provided by European
Environment Agency (EEA). The elevation data is of very high resolution (1 km x 1 km), allowing
me to calculate terrain roughness across Yugoslavia.
Intermarriage - Municipal data on the stock ratio of ethnic intermarriages to total marriages
is taken from the 1991 population census of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Popis Stanovništva 1991:
Porodice u Republici Bosni i Hercegovini, Rezultati za Republiku i po Opštinama/Općinama,
Federalni Zavod za Statistiku (1994)). Unfortunately, other Yugoslav republics did not gather
data on the stock of intermarriages at municipal level. The fraction of intermarried couples is
multiplied by two in order to derive a fraction of intermarried people.
War Casualties - This variable is the amount of people that died in the area of a municipality
during the Bosnian Civil War of 1992-1995. It is normalised by the 1991 population. These
war casualties did not necessarily hold permanent residence at the location of their death. In
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2012, the nongovernmental organisation (NGO) Istraživačko Dokumentacioni Centar Sarajevo
(Research and Documentation Center Sarajevo), with the assistance of other NGO’s, published
the Bosnian Book of the Dead (BBD) (Tokača, 2012). The book’s four hardback volumes list
almost 100,000 dead, civilian and military, by their name, their ethnicity, and when and where
they died. In an early stage report before the ﬁndings were released, an international team of
independent experts evaluated the project: “...the overall conclusion of our project is that the
level of incompleteness and deﬁciency in the BBD Database is low and fairly acceptable. The
database is a remarkable achievement of all those who have worked on this project” (Ball et al.
(2007), p. 7).
A.2 Theoretical framework
This section provides a simple model to describe which individuals might adopt a Yugoslav
identity, which guides the empirical analysis of the main text. The model is not exhaustive.
Its aim is rather to build a basic intuition behind the relationship between ethnic diversity
and national sentiment. I use individual theoretical analysis to generate hypotheses about
the determinants of Yugoslav identiﬁcation at the municipal level. My macro-level empirical
framework is an aggregation of micro-level reasoning.
Assume that there are two types of national categories, Yugoslavs, Y , and non-Yugoslavs, N .
A non-Yugoslav identity corresponds to the ethnic roots of an individual. The ideal non-Yugoslav
has attributes an, while the ideal Yugoslav has attributes ay. The identity pay-oﬀ a non-Yugoslav
incurs depends on her self-image, In, and the extent to which her attributes, a, correspond to her
category’s ideal attributes, tn(an − a). There might be a mismatch between who an individual
is, a, and who that individual wants to be, an. If there is a mismatch between the two, an
individual will incur a physic loss equivalent to tn(an − a).
Similar to Akerlof and Kranton (2002), the parameter t measures how diﬃcult it is for
individuals with diﬀerent characteristics to ﬁt in a national category. Akerlof and Kranton (2002)
argue that the parameter t can be lowered through a policy of creating a sense of community. If
so, a government could aﬀect an individual’s sense of belonging to a nation through policies like
education. The parameter t can likely be aﬀected by a range of other socio-economic factors as
well.
The identity pay-oﬀ of a Yugoslav is completely synonymous to that of a non-Yugoslav. An
individual can choose how Yugoslav they feel, y, which is treated as a continuous variable on a
unit interval. By choosing to be a Yugoslav, an individual reduces the weight on the overall
identity pay-oﬀ associated with her ethnic roots. An individual can thus have multiple identities.
If an individual chooses Yugoslav identity, she will incur costs, β, that are relative to the costs
of remaining loyal to the ethnic roots of an individual. The costs of becoming a Yugoslav can be
perceived as costs of identity switching (Caselli and Coleman, 2013), or as costs of “betraying”
one’s ethnic roots (Manning and Roy, 2010). They can take several forms. They can take the
form of direct monetary (opportunity) costs, like lost access to jobs allocated by ethnic criteria.
They can also take the form of physic costs, like ostracism from an ethnic-based community.
Finally, they can take the form of prejudice, along the lines of (Allport, 1954).
An individual thus maximises her identity pay-oﬀ by choosing how Yugoslav she feels:
V (y) = (1 − y)(In − tn(an − a)) + y(Iy − ty(ay − a) − βy) (5)
where the costs of becoming a Yugoslav are proportional to the intensity of Yugoslav feeling.
If an individual does not feel as a Yugoslav at all, i.e. if y = 0, she will derive identity pay-oﬀ
solely from her ethnic roots. Equation 5 will collapse to:
Vn = In − tn(an − a) (6)
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Such individuals can be interpreted as having no belief whatsoever in the Yugoslav nation. If so,
they can be characterised as ethnic nationalists. Equivalently, if y = 1, an individual does not
feel attached to her ethnic roots at all. Instead, she ﬁrmly identiﬁes with the Yugoslav nation.
Her identity pay-oﬀ will collapse to:
Vy = Iy − ty(ay − a) − β (7)
Why would ethnic diversity matter? A higher ethnic diversity could decrease the cost of identity
switching, and stimulate national feeling. There are three relevant channels. First, ethnic
diversity decreases the amount of resources an ethnic group can mobilise to punish its defecting
member. Second, ethnic diversity decreases the amount of ethnic-speciﬁc connections a defecting
individual would sever, which would otherwise involve a physic loss. Finally, according to Allport
(1954), ethnic diversity decreases prejudice, decreasing the likelihood that an individual will be
punished.
Formally, the cost of betraying one’s ethnic roots depends negatively on ethnic diversity, e,
and a vector of variables, z:
β = β(e, z) (8)
Ethnic diversity could also have an indirect eﬀect on the overall identity pay-oﬀ through aﬀecting
the characteristics or ethnic markers of an individual. Such ethnic markers could, for instance,
take the form of the ethnic background of the spouse or partner of an individual, or the ethnic
background of individual’s parents. To focus on the former case, suppose that an ideal member
of an ethnicity should marry or be in relationship with a member of the same ethnicity. For
instance, an ideal Croat should marry another Croat, rather than say a Serb or a Slovene. In
contrast, suppose that for an ideal Yugoslav the ethnicity of her spouse or partner is irrelevant.25
To formalise these ideas, deﬁne c = an − a, and d = ay − a. Suppose that c is an increasing
function of ethnic intermarriage, i, while d is independent of ethnic intermarriage. Suppose that
intermarriage in turns depends on ethnic diversity, and a vector of variables, x. Finally, assume
further that both c and d depend, for simplicity, on an identical vector of other variables, f :
c(i, f) = c(i(e, x), f) (9)
d = d(f) (10)
Intuitively, intermarriage depends on the existence of possible matches between ethnically
heterogeneous individuals, which is a supply-side issue. Intermarriage is impossible if the are no
ethnically heterogeneous individuals in a society. All else given, an increase in ethnic diversity
will increase the incidence of intermarriage. Even if an individual has a strong preference towards
endogamy, in the extreme case of perfect ethnic heterogeneity, an individual will have to marry
a member of another ethnicity unless that individual is willing to rather remain unmarried.
Intermarriage will in turn increase the mismatch between the individual’s attributes and the
ideal attributes of a non-Yugoslav. An increase in ethnic diversity will thus increase the identity
loss associated with a non-Yugoslav identity relative to a Yugoslav identity, stimulating Yugoslav
sentiment.26
In order to derive what determines Yugoslav sentiment, substitute equations 8, 9, and 10
25Yugoslav identity, as discussed in the previous section, was not based on ethnic markers. Of course, it was
initially based on the idea of South Slav unity. However, it evolved over time to be even more inclusive than that
(Djokić, 2003).
26These implications will hold as long as Yugoslavs cared less about the ethnicity of their spouse or partner
relative to non-Yugoslavs. Of course, it is also possible to imagine that Yugoslavs valued intermarriage as an
attribute. The eﬀect would then be even more pronounced.
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into equation 5, and maximise equation 5 with respect to y:
y =
Iy − In + tnc(i(e, x), f) − tyd(f)
2β(e, z)
(11)
For the maximisation problem to have a non-negative solution on a continuous unit interval,
auxiliary assumptions require that the numerator is larger than zero, and that the denominator is
equal to or larger than the numerator. Ethnic diversity has an impact on Yugoslav identiﬁcation
through aﬀecting the cost of becoming a Yugoslav. An increase in ethnic diversity will reduce the
cost of becoming a Yugoslav, and hence stimulate Yugoslav identiﬁcation. Ethnic diversity has a
further impact on Yugoslav feeling through impacting the incidence of intermarriage. Subject to
cost, some individuals will reject an ethnic-centred identity because they do not ﬁt in. Instead,
they will gravitate towards an identity that is not based on ethnic markers. Such individuals will
identify with the wider nation rather than with a speciﬁc ethnicity. While acknowledging that
other factors have an impact on national identiﬁcation as well, the aim of the empirical analysis
in the main text is to investigate the impact of ethnic diversity on Yugoslav self-identiﬁcation.
A.3 Alternative estimators: GLM and PPML
OLS estimates might be inappropriate for two reasons. First, the relationship between ethnic
fractionalisation and Yugoslav self-identiﬁcation is not necessarily monotonic. Second, my
estimates predict negative values of the population share of Yugoslavs. Even though the aim of
the analysis is to describe, rather than to forecast, this still creates an odd problem.
There are two estimators that can be employed to assess the extent to which these two
problems might bias the OLS estimates. First, Papke and Wooldridge (1996) propose a quasi-
likelihood general linear model (GLM) for regression models with a fractional dependent variable.
Their model is also ﬂexible in dealing with alternative functional forms. Second, Silva and
Tenreyro (2006) propose a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator for regression
models with a fractional dependent variable and that are characterised by non-linearities.
This section reports the GLM and PPML estimators that replicate the table 2, column 15,
model. The GLM coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity in column 1 of table 11 implies that a unit
increase in ethnic fractionalisation is associated with an increase in the fraction of Yugoslavs by
0.0692 units. The PPML coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity in column 2 of table 11 implies that a
unit increase in ethnic fractionalisation is associated with an increase in the fraction of Yugoslavs
by 0.0702 units. The alternative estimators imply marginal coeﬃcients on ethnic diversity that
are very similar to the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity provided by the OLS estimator. As such, I
prefer to use OLS estimates in the main text because the interpretation of OLS coeﬃcients is
easier.
A.4 Additional control: Communist Party membership
Burg and Berbaum (1989) argue that Yugoslav identiﬁcation signiﬁed political integration and
regime support. In the main text of the paper, I have already included army presence to test
their hypothesis. To test further the interpretation of Yugoslav identiﬁcation as signifying regime
support, I control for the population fraction of the Communist Party members in this section.
However, I must restrict the analysis to Croatia due to data availability. I have not been able to
ﬁnd Communist Party membership records of the other regions in the archives.
Table 12 documents the OLS estimates when controlling for the Communist Party membership.
Column 1 begins by showing the eﬀect of ethnic diversity on Yugoslav sentiment in the absence
of controls. In column 2, I control for the Communist Party membership. The coeﬃcient on that
variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, once I include the baseline controls
in column 3, the coeﬃcient on Communist Party membership loses signiﬁcance. The coeﬃcient
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on ethnic diversity remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant throughout the speciﬁcations.
There is no strong evidence that communists were more likely to feel Yugoslav.
A.5 Additional control: Religious diversity
In this section, I explore the relationship between religious diversity and Yugoslav sentiment.
Religious diversity is sometimes used as a proxy for ethnic diversity in the literature (Alesina
et al., 2003). Of course, religious diversity might also inﬂuence nation sentiment independent of
ethnic diversity.
Table 13 documents the OLS estimates when using religious diversity. I begin the analysis in
column 1 by including religious diversity in the absence of controls. The coeﬃcient on religious
diversity is statistically signiﬁcant, and its size is similar to the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity
in table 2. Religiously diverse municipalities are thus associated with a greater fraction of
self-declared Yugoslavs. Nevertheless, when I include both ethnic and religious diversity in
column 2, the coeﬃcient on religious diversity loses signiﬁcance, while the coeﬃcient on ethnic
diversity remains signiﬁcant. I ﬁnd the same results when I include the baseline controls in
column 3. Conditional on ethnic diversity, there is no evidence that religious diversity inﬂuenced
Yugoslav identity.
A.6 Sub-samples
This section analyses the eﬀect of ethnic diversity on Yugoslav sentiment for a variety of sub-
samples. Given the inclusion of region eﬀects in the analysis, the obvious choice is to analyse
the data of each regions that constituted Yugoslavia. Table 14 documents the results. The
coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity across the regions clusters in the range of 0.041-0.077. Slovenia,
however, is characterised by a lower coeﬃcient of 0.016. The ﬁndings are statistically signiﬁcant
across the regions apart from Montenegro. The insigniﬁcant result for Montenegro is, perhaps,
unsurprising, given that Montenegro was composed of only 20 municipalities. It might be that
there is too much noise in the data, given the low amount of observations.
A.7 Settlement data
This section analyses measurement issues that might impact my results. Ethnic segregation
seems to be the most important measurement problem, biasing the OLS estimates towards zero.
Even if municipalities were characterised by a high degree of ethnic diversity, it might be the
case that individuals within these municipalities were not exposed to the individuals of another
ethnicity in practice. For example, if there was one Serbian-dominated village next to another
Croatian-dominated village, the ethnic fractionalisation index will yield a high value for the
municipality that contains these villages. This might be misleading, if the individuals of one
ethnicity were not exposed to the individuals of another ethnicity from the other village in
practice.
Measuring ethnic diversity at a more granular, settlement, level should better correspond to
the actual degree of interethnic contact that individuals experience. Settlements, rather than
municipalities, presumably better correspond to the daily environment of an individual, and
thus to the interethnic contact that individual is exposed to.
For that matter, as Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2017) argue, the relationship between
ethnic heterogeneity and economic development is complex. Empirical research working with
cross-country data typically ﬁnds a negative relationship. However, research that uses within-
country data usually ﬁnds a positive relationship between diversity and development. This
implies that ethnic diversity eﬀects depend on the area used as the unit of observation.
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A.7.1 OLS estimates with settlement data
Table 15 presents the OLS estimates of ethnic diversity when using the settlement data. Due to
imperfect data, I restrict the analysis to Croatia. For comparison, I ﬁrst report in column 1 the
OLS estimate when I use the municipal data without any controls, which is 0.058. In column
2, I repeat the same exercise, but at settlement-level, where the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity
increases to 0.081. Measuring the relationship at more granular level is more appropriate,
yielding a higher coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity. My baseline estimates are thus biased towards
zero, providing a lower bound estimate of the true size of the ethnic diversity eﬀect.
The drawback of using the settlement data is the lower amount of controls that I can use.
The coverage of settlements by the statistical oﬃce was not as wide as it was for municipalities.
Nevertheless, in column 3, I include the controls that I was able to extract. To control for
economic development, I include average years of schooling, agricultural employment share and
population density. Given that towns are diﬀerent to rural areas across a range of characteristics,
I also control for town eﬀects. To control for potential noise in the data, I include the size of the
population - many villages were extremely small, numbering only a few inhabitants. Finally,
I also control for a range of relevant geographical factors, like agricultural suitability of land,
terrain roughness, distance to the nearest river, distance to the coast, latitude, longitude, and
the interaction between latitude and longitude. The inclusion of these control increases the
coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity to 0.12, and it remains signiﬁcant at 1%.
A.7.2 IV estimates with settlement data
I now assess whether the IV strategy works when using the settlement data. The border changes,
however, are still estimated for municipalities. Each settlement within the same municipality
thus contains the same number of border changes. Table 16 displays the results when using the
IV estimates. The second stage coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity increases to 0.16, and is signiﬁcant
at the 1 per cent level. It is highly reassuring that the results are robust even when using
alternative, more granular, data.
A.8 Individual-level survey data
In this section, I analyse the relationship between ethnic diversity and Yugoslav sentiment at
individual-level. I was able to ﬁnd data only for Croatia and Serbia that can be used for this
purpose. I derive data for each of these two regions from the pre-election surveys that were
conducted in 1990, in anticipation of the ﬁrst democratic elections in post-war Yugoslavia.
The two surveys contain a range of questions regarding the political attitudes of the respon-
dents, as well as their demographic and economic conditions, including their nationality. Given
that the municipality of the respondents is reported as well, I am able to match this survey
data with the ethnic diversity data from the population census. This allows me to test the
relationship between ethnic diversity and Yugoslav sentiment at individual-level.
The results are reported in table 17. Column 1 shows the results for Croatia, while column 2
shows the results for Serbia. The relationship between ethnic diversity and Yugoslav sentiment
is positive and signiﬁcant in both cases. In table 18, I use the IV strategy where I instrument
ethnic diversity with border changes. The ﬁrst stage results are positive for both Croatia and
Serbia - there is a positive association between border changes and ethnic diversity, In the
second stage, I use the variation in ethnic diversity caused by border changes to predict Yugoslav
self-identiﬁcation. The impact of ethnic diversity on Yugoslav sentiment is positive for both
Croatia and Serbia, but signiﬁcant only for Serbia.
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A.9 Bias from un-observables
Despite using a rich set of controls, the estimates reported in table 2 might be biased by un-
observable factors correlated with selection into ethnically diverse areas. I assess the likelihood
that the estimates are biased by un-observables by using the method developed by Altonji et al.
(2005), and adapted to the case where the dependent variable is continuous by Bellows and
Miguel (2009).
Altonji et al. (2005) argue that the selection on observables can be used to assess the potential
bias from un-observables. Furthermore, the strength of selection on un-observables, relative
to selection on observables, can be estimated by a ratio that would decrease the coeﬃcient of
interest to zero. The size of this ratio can in turn provide meaningful information concerning
the extent of the omitted variable bias. This ratio can be estimated by using two regressions.
The ﬁrst regression runs a restricted model, where the estimated coeﬃcient for the variable of
interest is denoted by βR (where R stands for restricted). The second regression runs a fully
speciﬁed model, where the estimated coeﬃcient for the variable of interest is denoted by βF
(where F stands for full). Then, the Altonji et al. (2005) ratio is calculated as βF /(βR − βF ).
Intuitively, the stronger is the numerator, βF , the stronger is the eﬀect after controlling for
observables, and un-observables would have to explain more in order to reduce the coeﬃcient of
interest to zero. Concerning the denominator, βR − βF , the smaller is the diﬀerence between βR
and βF , the estimate is aﬀected less by selection on observables, and the stronger the selection
of un-observables would need to be in order to reduce the coeﬃcient of interest to zero.
I use two sets of controls to estimate how much stronger the eﬀect of omitted variables would
have to be, relative to observables, to attribute the entire OLS estimates to selection eﬀects.
The ﬁrst speciﬁed set consists of the baseline controls in table 2, column 15, speciﬁcation, while
the restricted set does not include any controls. The second set adds to the speciﬁed set the
additional, robustness, controls in table 5, column 7, speciﬁcation in the main text, while the
restricted set includes the baseline controls.
The results are presented in table 19. In the ﬁrst set, the Altonji et al. (2005) ratio is 6.67,
while in the second set, the ratio is 5.58. This means that selection on un-observables would
have to be at least 5.58 times greater than selection on observables to attribute the entire OLS
estimate to selection eﬀects. These results suggest that the omitted variable bias would have
to be very high to explain away the positive association between ethnic diversity and Yugoslav
sentiment.
A.10 Alternative instruments
In this section, I experiment with alternative instruments. The relationship between border
changes and ethnic diversity might be non-linear (ﬁgure 3). Column 1 of table 20 accounts
for this by including a squared term of the IV. Nevertheless, the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity
remains robust with the addition of the squared term.
In column 2, I include reconquests in the instrument. The beneﬁt of this IV is that it varies
to a greater degree across Yugoslav municipalities than the baseline instrument which excludes
the reconquests (see appendix A.1 for how the baseline instrument is constructed). The cost
of this alternative IV, however, is that it is more likely to be mismeasured. For example, the
Great Turkish War (1683–1699) led to frequent border changes between the Habsburg and
Ottoman Empires. During this war, the Habsburgs had reconquered eastern and northern areas
of modern-day Croatia and Serbia, respectively. The war, however, was characterised by a
multitude of oﬀensives and counter-oﬀensives. The front-line between the two empires were
in a constant state of ﬂux, which the historical atlases I use tend to under-report (Regan and
Kaniški, 2003).
Having said this, the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity remains signiﬁcant with the alternative
IV, and its size is slightly higher than the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity when using the baseline
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IV. I believe that the cost of the alternative instrument outweighs the beneﬁt, and prefer to use
the baseline IV in the remainder of the paper.
A.11 Spatial models
This section experiments with spatial models, as my estimates might be spatially correlated,
biasing the results. Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the fraction of Yugoslavs, ethnic diversity,
and border changes, tend to exhibit spatial patterns, clustered at regional-level. By including
region eﬀects, I have eliminated this source of variation between the regions. It is, however,
unclear whether accounting for these spatial patterns is an appropriate research strategy. Border
changes are “naturally” spatially autocorrelated, as rulers were conquering clusters of areas,
which later determined the borders of Yugoslav regions. By controlling for region eﬀects, I might
have eliminated a relevant source of variation in the IV.
Nevertheless, it remains interesting to assess how the spatial nature of the data aﬀects the
results. I experiment with spatial models in table 21. In column 1, I cluster standard errors
at regional level, which allows for the possibility of correlations between the error terms in the
municipalities within a region. This leads to an increase in the size of the standard error on
ethnic diversity from 0.010 in the baseline case (table 4) to 0.036.
It is, however, unclear whether clustering standard errors at a diﬀerent level of aggregation
is suﬃcient in dealing with spatial autocorrelation. Gibbons and Overman (2012) advocate the
path taken by most recent neighbourhood eﬀects research in spatial econometrics by including a
spatial lag of the main explanatory variable. This parameter describes the inﬂuence of neighbours’
characteristics, and likely picks up the eﬀect of the neighbours’ outcome as well. Column 2
includes the spatial lag of ethnic diversity - mean ethnic diversity of a municipality’s neighbours.
The inclusion of the spatial lag leads to an increase in the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity to 0.223.
Interestingly, the R-squared in panel B falls signiﬁcantly compared to the baseline R-squared
in table 4. This means that the spatial lag decreases the predictive power of the second-stage
regression, and thus indicates that the spatial lag is an irrelevant control. In column 3, I include
both the spatial lag and standard errors clustered at regional level, and the results are similar to
those in column 2.
A.12 Reduced-form results
This section brieﬂy presents the reduced-form results corresponding to the baseline 2SLS
regression in column 1 of table 4. Table 22 shows the coeﬃcient on border changes, which is
highly signiﬁcant and positively associated with the dependent variable - fraction of Yugoslavs.
These results are consistent with the IV estimates - border changes inﬂuenced ethnic diversity,
which stimulated Yugoslav sentiment.
A.13 Relaxing the exclusion restriction
The requirement of perfect exogeneity is a strict requirement. I recognize that my instrument is
unlikely to satisfy the exclusion restriction perfectly, and I thus follow the approach of Conley
et al. (2012) to relax it. They propose a method which allows for a direct eﬀect of the instrument
on the outcome variable - in this case, independent of ethnic diversity eﬀects. Following their
method, I assume that the potential impact of border changes on Yugoslav identiﬁcation, γ, is
uniformly distributed in the interval [−δ, δ]. With this method, by varying δ, I can identify the
threshold at which the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity in the second-stage becomes statistically
insigniﬁcant at the 10 per cent level.
I experiment with both a positive and negative interval of δ, as the potential direction of
the impact of the instrument on the dependent variable is ambiguous. For example, a historical
memory of belonging to many empires might have weakened the strength of local identities,
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Figure 4: Conﬁdence interval on ethnic diversity with relaxed exclusion restriction, Conley et al.
(2012) method
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Note: The ﬁgure shows the upper and lower bound of the 90% conﬁdence interval of the second-stage coeﬃcient
on ethnic diversity, using table 4, column 1, model. It follows the union of conﬁdence intervals approach in
Conley et al. (2012), which allows for a direct eﬀect of border changes on Yugoslav identiﬁcation, assuming this is
uniformly distributed in the interval [−δ, δ].
stimulating Yugoslav sentiment. On the other hand, it is also possible that historical memory of
belonging to many empires antagonized the local population, strengthened their local identities,
and thus negatively impacted Yugoslav sentiment.
Figure 4 relaxes the exclusion restriction, and identiﬁes the threshold of δ = 0.0086 at which
the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity in the second-stage becomes statistically insigniﬁcant at the
10 percent level. Put alternatively, as long as the direct eﬀect of border changes on Yugoslav
identiﬁcation is smaller then 0.0086, the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity remains signiﬁcant at
the 10 per cent level. For that matter, if δ < 0, the conﬁdence interval on the coeﬃcient on
ethnic diversity moves further from zero, relative to the baseline IV estimate in table 4. In other
words, if border changes had a negative impact on Yugoslav identiﬁcation, then the IV coeﬃcient
underestimates the true eﬀect of ethnic diversity on Yugoslav sentiment.
To gauge the magnitude of the threshold at which the coeﬃcient on ethnic diversity in the
second-stage becomes statistically insigniﬁcant, I estimate the reduced-form eﬀect of border
changes on Yugoslav sentiment in appendix A.12, which is 0.0099. The impact of the instrument
on Yugoslav identiﬁcation (δ = 0.0086) would thus have to be equivalent to 87 per cent of the
overall reduced-form eﬀect to render the validity of the 2SLS results insigniﬁcant. The analysis
thus reveals that the instrument would have to deviate very far from the exclusion restriction to
make my results insigniﬁcant.
A.14 Mediation analysis
Estimating the intermarriage mechanism is diﬃcult. This requires identifying the causal eﬀect
of the treatment (ethnic diversity) on the ﬁnal outcome (Yugoslav sentiment), as channelled
the mediator (intermarriage). Moreover, this also requires estimating the direct eﬀect of ethnic
diversity on Yugoslav identity, using a single instrument (border changes). Dippel et al. (2017)
propose a framework to deal with this problem. Their framework estimates the eﬀect of the
endogenous treatment on the ﬁnal outcome (total eﬀect), while decomposing this total eﬀect
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into a “direct eﬀect” and an “indirect eﬀect”, which runs through the mediator. The advantage
of this method over the standard IV is that, with a single instrument, the causal eﬀect of a
mediator on the ﬁnal outcome can also be estimated.
To provide more details: the ﬁrst step of the procedure is to estimate the eﬀect of the
treatment (ethnic diversity) on the ﬁnal outcome (Yugoslav sentiment), while instrumenting
the treatment with an IV (border changes). This step yields the “total eﬀect” of the ethnic
diversity on Yugoslav identity. The second step is to estimate the eﬀect of the ethnic diversity
on the mediator, again using border changes as an instrument. The ﬁnal step involves another
IV estimation where the eﬀect of the mediator on Yugoslav sentiment is estimated, conditional
on the treatment. In short, the framework provides a mediation eﬀect which is essentially a
linear combination of coeﬃcients from three diﬀerent regression. The full details can be found in
Dippel et al. (2017).
The mediation analysis is presented in table 23. The total eﬀect estimates that a unit increase
in the ethnic fractionalization index increases the fraction of Yugoslavs by 0.104 units. Under
the typical IV assumptions, this eﬀect is causal. The direct eﬀect estimates that only 0.0298
units of this increase are due to ethnic diversity itself. However, the indirect eﬀect estimates
that 0.059 units of this increase are caused by intermarriage as a mediating factor. This implies
that intermarriage explains 57% of the total eﬀect of ethnic diversity on Yugoslav sentiment.
A.15 The meaning of Yugoslav identity
In this section, I brieﬂy outline the meaning and content of Yugoslav identity. I provide anecdotal
evidence by focusing on the work and thoughts of the leading proponents of a supranational
Yugoslav culture - the unifying glue of a Yugoslav nation. It is diﬃcult to exactly deﬁne what
Yugoslav identity meant. Yugo-Slavism was never clearly deﬁned. It was interpreted in a variety
of ways (Djokić, 2003). However, this does not mean that Yugoslav identity had no meaning or
content. On the contrary.
Wachtel (1998) argues that attempts of Yugoslav nation building can be divided into three
basic categories concerning how a national culture or identity should be created, and on what
content should it be based upon. First, according to the earliest Yugoslav view, the South Slavs
should have adopted a modiﬁed form of Serbian culture. The Serbs were the largest ethnic
group, and were the ﬁrst in modern times to create an independent state. The proponents of
the second view thought that Yugoslav identity should be synthetic. The ideal Yugoslav culture
should adopt the best elements from the separate South Slavic cultures to create an overreaching
synthetic Yugoslav culture. Both views, however, did not imply that separate South Slavic
cultures should cease to exist. But, rather, that they would be made less relevant with the
emergence of a new Yugoslav culture. Separate South Slavic cultures would take a role of local
customs and traditions. The third view that emerged in the post-war period was that common
socialist features should be the unifying force of the country (section 2).
Wachtel (1998) argues that, of the above-mentioned views towards the construction of the
Yugoslav identity, the second view of a synthetic culture was the prominent one during the 20th
century. To get a better sense of what synthetic culture meant, it is useful to concentrate on the
work and thoughts of the leading proponents of it. Wachtel (1998) argues that the two most
publicly visible and famous proponents of a supranational synthetic Yugoslav culture were Ivan
Meštrović, a sculptor, and Ivo Andrić, a Nobel prize-winning author, both of whom were of
Croatian origin.
During the interwar period, Meštrović became a world-famous artist and the leading
spokesman for a new Yugoslav culture. Banac (1984) reports that those who knew Meštrović’s
views referred to him as “the prophet of Yugo-Slavism”. Meštrović believed that sculpture
oﬀered an ideal form for expressing a new Yugoslav synthesis. Sculpture is more accessible to
general audience than high literature. Moreover, by sculpting ﬁgures of mostly Serb epic poetry,
South Slavic identities could be melded. Sculpture was largely non-existent in the Serbian
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Orthodox-based culture, which prohibits three dimensional ﬁgures of divinity. On the other
hand, sculpture was well-developed in the renaissance Dalmatian towns.
Meštrović entered the Yugoslav public scene and became the best-known domestic artist
with his controversial exhibition at the Rome Exposition of 1911. There, he created a sculpture
of Serbian folk-legend hero Prince Marko. Meštrović described the statue of Prince Marko as
symbolising the Yugoslav people, “with its gigantic and noble heart” (Banac, 1984). At the
Rome exhibition, Meštrović also created a model of the temple of Kosovo, which holds a central
location in the Serbian national myth as a birthplace of the medieval Serbian Kingdom. His
temple of Kosovo combined Catholic and Orthodox architectural elements. The visual symbolism
was obvious. The aim was to create an architectural synthesis of Yugoslav identity. Temple of
Kosovo would be something to Yugoslavs what, say, Louvre is to the French (Wachtel, 1998). In
addition to his visual representations of the Yugoslav nation, Meštrović wrote poetry speaking
of a “Yugoslav race” (Banac, 1984).
As additional anecdotal evidence, consider the work of Ivo Andrić. His work symbolised,
perhaps, the postwar Yugoslav literary canon the most. During WWII he wrote his two most
famous novels, Na Drini Ćuprija (The Bridge on the Drina) and Travnička Kronika (Bosnian
Chronicle). Upon their release in the aftermath of WWII, the works were almost instantly
proclaimed classics of the Yugoslav literature (Wachtel, 1998). His two great novels are set in
multicultural and multi-ethnic Bosnia. They chronicle the diﬃcult historical interaction of the
ethnicities of Yugoslavia, while holding hope for a supranational union that might bind them
together. For example, the bridge in the The Bridge on the Drina is often interpreted, rightly or
wrongly, as symbolising Yugoslavia (Wachtel, 1998). Like the bridge, Yugoslavia was to be a
mediator between Eastern and Western cultural traditions, connecting and blending both in a
unique synthesis.
There were, of course, other artists that promoted Yugoslav identity. A prominent institution
whose aim was to promote and develop Yugoslav identity was the literary magazine Književni
Jug (Literary South). Its explicit aim was to lay ground for a future Yugoslav literature. Its
duration was short lived (1918-1919), but many of the authors that are considered today as
some of the greatest authors of the successor states of Yugoslavia published there. These include
the Slovenian Ivan Cankar, the Croatian Vladimir Nazor, Tin Ujević, and Ivo Vojnović, the
Serbian Sima Pandurović, and the Bosnian Aleksa Šantic (Milisavac, 1971).
In terms of popular culture, Yugoslav rock music is considered to be a crucial foundation of
supranational identity in late Yugoslavia, especially in the youth. Ramet (1992) argues that rock
music in Yugoslavia was seen as by many of its purveyors as pan-Yugoslav, a force that brought
people together and created ties of mutual acceptance. It created a shared cultural space and
common reference points, superseding ethnic boundaries (Perković, 2011). Ramet (1992) argues
that, symptomatically, many of the leading ﬁgures of the Yugoslav rock scene emphasised that
they were “Yugoslavs”, as opposed to say Serbs or Slovenes.
It was, however, not only rock music that served as a purveyor and constructor of Yugoslav
feeling. Pop-folk, which reached extremely high levels of popularity during the 1980s (and remains
equally popular today in Yugoslav successor states, if not more), also mattered. Consider the
example of Fahreta Živojinović, better known as Lepa Brena. Since her pop-folk career began in
the early 1980s, Lepa Brena became arguably the most popular singer of Yugoslavia. She still
maintains a strong popularity in Yugoslav successor states. In 1989, Lepa Brena released the
controversial song Jugoslavenka (Yugoslavian (girl)), which is unashamedly pro-Yugoslav. It
remains one of her most popular songs. While there were plenty of popular song earlier celebrating
Yugoslavia and its identity, many were implicitly or explicitly glorifying the socialist regime.
As such, Ramet (1992) describes some of these “patriotic” songs as sycophantic. Yugoslavian
by Lepa Brena, on the other hand, seems genuine. It was written at the time of rising ethnic
nationalism. Pro-Yugoslav songs during the late 1980s were strongly damaging to a singer’s
career (Perković, 2011). In the song, Lepa Brena relates features of a beautiful Yugoslav girl
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with the geographic and other features of Yugoslavia:
Where are you from, pretty girl
who gave birth to the blue eye
who gave you the golden hair
who made you so passionate
Chorus x2
My eyes are Adriatic sea
my hair is Panonian wheat
wistful is my Sloven soul
I’m Yugoslavian
Where are you from, pretty girl
where did you grow, spring ﬂower
where free sun is warming you
when you dance so seductively
Chorus 2x
Where are you from, pretty stranger (girl)
where have you been stealing sun’s shine
where were you drinking honey wine
when your kiss is so sweet
Chorus 2x
It is, perhaps, not surprising that Lepa Brena still explicitly identiﬁes herself as “Yugoslav”, and
feeling “Yugonostalgic”. In her own words in 2008: “If someone has a right to declare themselves
as Croat or Serb, I too have a right to declare myself as Yugoslav. Yugoslavia was speciﬁc in
many ways... Similar to [former] Yugoslavia lives united Europe [today], which is a civilised
society. I admit, I am Yugonostalgic, and I think you shouldn’t close doors to other people.
You have to respect the right of people with another colour of skin, religion, and diversity...”
(Index.hr, 2008, December 8) (author’s translation, squared brackets inserted by author).
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Table 11: GLM and PPML estimates, dependent vari-
able: fraction of Yugoslavs
(1) (2)
GLM PPML
Ethnic fractionalisation 2.7127*** 2.5970***
(0.187) (0.177)
Output p.c. 0.0007 0.0007
(0.016) (0.015)
Population density 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000)
Avg. years of schooling 0.4107*** 0.3870***
(0.069) (0.066)
Social sector labour 0.1811 0.1825
(0.339) (0.324)
Youth labour actions -0.6430 -0.6027
(0.396) (0.380)
WWII partisan veterans 11.1942 10.7425
(11.916) (11.349)
Monuments to anti-fascism -0.1301 -0.1254
(0.091) (0.087)
Fascist terror 2.8319*** 2.7390***
(0.632) (0.604)
Public goods exp. p.c. -0.0060 -0.0052
(0.011) (0.011)
Federal aid -0.0557 -0.0467
(0.108) (0.104)
1980’s generation -2.5976 -2.3216
(3.423) (3.300)
Army presence 0.2616*** 0.2495***
(0.098) (0.093)
Region eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations 434 434
R-squared n.a. 0.639
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 12: OLS estimates with Communist Party membership, de-
pendent variable: fraction of Yugoslavs
(1) (2) (3)
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.0579*** 0.0537*** 0.0585***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Communist Party members 0.1630*** 0.0654
(0.058) (0.069)
Baseline Controls No No Yes
Observations 102 102 102
R-squared 0.503 0.529 0.640
Notes: The analysis is restricted to Croatia due to data availability.
Baseline controls are output p.c, population density, average years of
schooling, fraction of social sector employment, population fraction of
youth labour actions, population fraction of WWII partisan veterans,
sites containing monuments to anti-fascism, population fraction of
individuals exposed to WWII fascist terror, expenditure on public
goods p.c., federal aid, population percentage of the early 1980’s
generation, sites containing army presence, and region eﬀects. These
controls are identical to those in column 15 of table 2. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 13: OLS estimates with religious diversity, dependent vari-
able: fraction of Yugoslavs
(1) (2) (3)
Religious fractionalisation 0.0787*** -0.0190 0.0005
(0.008) (0.030) (0.029)
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.1087*** 0.0790***
(0.031) (0.029)
Baseline controls No No Yes
Observations 434 434 434
R-squared 0.242 0.321 0.555
Notes: Baseline controls are output p.c, population density, average
years of schooling, fraction of social sector employment, population
fraction of youth labour actions, population fraction of WWII
partisan veterans, sites containing monuments to anti-fascism,
population fraction of individuals exposed to WWII fascist terror,
expenditure on public goods p.c., federal aid, population percentage
of the early 1980’s generation, sites containing army presence, and
region eﬀects. These controls are identical to those in column 15
of table 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 14: OLS estimates, sub-samples, dependent variable: fraction of Yugoslavs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Croatia Bosnia Montenegro Serbia Slovenia
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.0595*** 0.0424*** 0.0414 0.0771*** 0.0162**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.075) (0.020) (0.008)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 102 109 20 143 60
R-squared 0.638 0.728 0.834 0.576 0.775
Notes: Baseline controls are output p.c, population density, average years of schooling,
fraction of social sector employment, population fraction of youth labour actions, popu-
lation fraction of WWII partisan veterans, sites containing monuments to anti-fascism,
population fraction of individuals exposed to WWII fascist terror, expenditure on public
goods p.c., federal aid, population percentage of the early 1980’s generation, sites contain-
ing army presence, and region eﬀects. These controls are identical to those in column 15
of table 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 15: OLS estimates with settlement data, dependent variable: fraction
of Yugoslavs
Municipality level Settlement level
(1) (2) (3)
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.0579*** 0.0814*** 0.1201***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.023)
Controls No No Yes
Observations 102 6,295 6,290
R-squared 0.503 0.027 0.048
Notes: The analysis is restricted to Croatia due to data availability. Con-
trols are average years of schooling, agricultural employment share, town
eﬀects, population density, population, agricultural (wheat) suitability,
terrain roughness, distance to the coast, distance to the nearest river, longi-
tude, latitude, and the interaction between longitude and latitude. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 16: 2SLS estimates with settlement data, dependent
variable: fraction of Yugoslavs
(1)
Panel A: ﬁrst stage outcome - ethnic fractionalisation
Border changes, 1421-1816 0.0444***
(0.003)
Controls Yes
R-squared 0.3355
Panel B: second stage outcome - fraction of Yugoslavs
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.1706***
(0.024)
Controls Yes
Observations 6,290
Centered R-squared 0.0406
Sanderson-Windmeijer ﬁrst stage F-test 202.75***
Notes: The analysis is restricted to Croatia due to data
availability. Controls are average years of schooling, agri-
cultural employment share, town eﬀects, population den-
sity, population, agricultural (wheat) suitability, terrain
roughness, distance to the coast, distance to the nearest
river, longitude, latitude, and the interaction between
longitude and latitude. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 17: Individual-level data, dependent variable: Yu-
goslav self-identiﬁcation
(1) (2)
Croatia Serbia
Ethnic fractionalisation 2.0587*** 36.6378***
(0.403) (8.808)
Settlement type Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes
Communist party memebrship Yes Yes
Income No Yes
Observations 2,440 1,314
Number of municipalities 12 13
Pseudo R-squared 0.1014 0.1514
Notes: The unit of observation is the individual. The coeﬃ-
cients are derived from a logit estimation. Settlement type
includes three categories in Croatia, and four categories in
Serbia. Education includes ﬁve categories in Croatia, and
six in Serbia. Occupation includes ten categories in Croatia,
and nine in Serbia. Communist Party membership includes
three categories in Croatia, and two in Serbia. Income
includes six categories in Serbia. Ethnic fractionalisation
is measured at municipal-level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Data: Survey data for Croatia is taken from Siber (1997),
and survey data for Serbia is from Goati (1998).
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Table 18: IV estimates with individual-level data, dependent
variable: Yugoslav self-identiﬁcation
(1) (2)
Croatia Serbia
Panel A: ﬁrst stage outcome - ethnic fractionalisation
Border changes, 1421-1816 0.0379*** 0.0352***
(0.004) (0.003)
Settlement type Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes
Communist party memebrship Yes Yes
Income No Yes
Panel B: second stage outcome -self-identiﬁed Yugoslavs
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.0017 38.4917***
(1.175) (14.242)
Settlement type Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes
Communist party memebrship Yes Yes
Income No Yes
Observations 2,440 1,314
Number of municipalities 12 13
Notes: The unit of observation is the individual. Settlement
type includes three categories in Croatia, and four categories
in Serbia. Education includes ﬁve categories in Croatia, and
six in Serbia. Occupation includes ten categories in Croatia,
and nine in Serbia. Communist Party membership includes
three categories in Croatia, and two in Serbia. Income
includes six categories in Serbia. Ethnic fractionalisation
is measured at municipal-level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Data: Survey data for Croatia is taken from Siber (1997),
and survey data for Serbia is from Goati (1998).
58
Table 19: Bias from un-observables, Altonji et al. (2005) method,
dependent variable: fraction of Yugoslavs
Controls in the restricted set Controls in the full set (1)
None Baseline controls 6.67
Baseline controls Additional controls 5.58
Notes: Following the methodology of Altonji et al. (2005), the
table reports the strength of selection on unobservables, relative
to observables, that is required to to attribute the entire OLS es-
timates of the relationship between ethnic diversity and Yugoslav
identiﬁcation to selection eﬀects. Baseline controls are output
p.c, population density, average years of schooling, fraction of
social sector employment, population fraction of youth labour
actions, population fraction of WWII partisan veterans, sites
containing monuments to anti-fascism, population fraction of in-
dividuals exposed to WWII fascist terror, expenditure on public
goods p.c., federal aid, population percentage of the early 1980’s
generation, sites containing army presence, and region eﬀects.
These controls are identical to those in column 15 of table 2.
Additional controls are fraction of minorities, fraction of Mus-
lims, duration of Habsburg rule, agricultural (wheat) suitability,
coast, and geographic controls. These controls are identical to
those in column 7 of table 5.
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Table 20: 2SLS estimates with alternative instruments
(1) (2)
Panel A: ﬁrst stage outcome - ethnic fractionalisation
Border changes, 1421-1816 0.0759*
(0.039)
Border changes, 1421-1816 - squared -0.0005
(0.007)
Border changes, 1421-1816 (including reconquests) 0.0256***
(0.005)
Baseline controls Yes Yes
R-squared 0.403 0.370
Panel B: second stage outcome - fraction of Yugoslavs
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.1343*** 0.1608***
(0.027) (0.028)
Baseline controls Yes Yes
Observations 434 434
Centered R-squared 0.479 0.387
Sanderson-Windmeijer ﬁrst stage F-test 29.01*** 26.24***
Notes: Baseline controls are output p.c, population density, average years of
schooling, fraction of social sector employment, population fraction of youth
labour actions, population fraction of WWII partisan veterans, sites contain-
ing monuments to anti-fascism, population fraction of individuals exposed to
WWII fascist terror, expenditure on public goods p.c., federal aid, population
percentage of the early 1980’s generation, sites containing army presence, and
region eﬀects. These controls are identical to those in column 15 of table 2.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 21: 2SLS estimates with spatial models
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: ﬁrst stage outcome - ethnic fractionalisation
Border changes, 1421-1816 0.0729*** 0.0280*** 0.0280*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
Spatial lag - Ethnic fractionalisation 0.7651*** 0.7651***
(0.053) (0.049)
Region-clustered standard errors Yes No Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.403 0.625 0.625
Panel B: second stage outcome - fraction of Yugoslavs
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.1353*** 0.2230*** 0.2230***
(0.036) (0.077) (0.085)
Spatial lag - Ethnic fractionalisation -0.1091* -0.1091*
(0.063) (0.064)
Region-clustered standard errors Yes No Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 434 434 434
Centered R-squared 0.476 0.224 0.224
Sanderson-Windmeijer ﬁrst stage F-test 106.48*** 10.90*** 4.62*
Notes: Baseline controls are output p.c, population density, average years of
schooling, fraction of social sector employment, population fraction of youth
labour actions, population fraction of WWII partisan veterans, sites containing
monuments to anti-fascism, population fraction of individuals exposed to WWII
fascist terror, expenditure on public goods p.c., federal aid, population percentage
of the early 1980’s generation, sites containing army presence, and region eﬀects.
These controls are identical to those in column 15 of table 2. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 22: Reduced-form results, dependent
variable: fraction of Yugoslavs, OLS
(1)
Border changes, 1421-1816 0.0099***
(0.002)
Observations 434
R-squared 0.442
Controls Yes
Notes: Baseline controls are output p.c,
population density, average years of school-
ing, fraction of social sector employment,
population fraction of youth labour ac-
tions, population fraction of WWII parti-
san veterans, sites containing monuments
to anti-fascism, population fraction of indi-
viduals exposed to WWII fascist terror, ex-
penditure on public goods p.c., federal aid,
population percentage of the early 1980’s
generation, sites containing army presence,
and region eﬀects. These controls are iden-
tical to those in column 15 of table 2. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 23: Mediation analysis, dependent variable: fraction of Yugoslavs
(1)
Total eﬀect of ethnic fractionalization 0.1037***
(0.026)
Direct eﬀect of ethnic fractionalization 0.0298*
(0.017)
Indirect eﬀect of ethnic fractionalization 0.059**
(0.029)
Baseline controls Yes
Observations 109
F-statistic for excluded instruments
- First stage, step one (treatment regressed against instrument) 49.473
- First stage, step two (mediator regressed against instrument, conditional on treatment) 11.07
Notes: The mediation analysis is conducted following the framework of Dippel et al. (2017). The indirect
eﬀect of ethnic diversity operates through the channel of intermarriage (mediator). The instrument is
border changes during 1421-1816. The analysis is restricted to Bosnia-Herzegovina since the intermarriage
data is not available for other regions. Baseline controls are output p.c, population density, average years
of schooling, fraction of social sector employment, population fraction of youth labour actions, population
fraction of WWII partisan veterans, sites containing monuments to anti-fascism, population fraction of
individuals exposed to WWII fascist terror, expenditure on public goods p.c., federal aid, population
percentage of the early 1980’s generation, sites containing army presence. These controls are identical to
those in column 15 of table 2. Standard errors in parentheses. Note however, that they do not hold any
conventional meaning, and should be interpreted with caution. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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